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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
‘Early law viewed children primarily as agents for the devolution of property 
within an organized family setting.... It might not be an exaggeration to say the 
social role of children was primarily seen as furthering the interests of the 
family group as a whole and over time by maintaining and perhaps extending 
the family's land-holding.’  
John Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights’1 
South Africa’s era as a constitutional democracy has coincided with the recognition 
of children as independent rights-holders within its legal system. Signature and 
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)2 and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)3 demonstrated the 
Republic’s commitment to children’s rights on the international stage. South Africa’s 
Constitution features a dedicated section on children’s rights,4 and enshrines the 
principle that the best interests of the child are ‘of paramount importance’ in every 
matter concerning the child.5 Whereas Roman-Dutch and English law historically 
conceptualised children as their parents’ property6 or as conduits of family property,7 
children today enjoy enforceable legal rights to property and material support. South 
African law has decisively deemed the interests of children worthy of constitutional 
 
1 Eekelaar ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights’ (1986) 6 Oxford J of Legal Studies 161 at 163. 
2 South Africa signed the CRC in 1993 and ratified it on 16 June 1995: https://indicators.ohchr.org/ 
accessed 26 November 2019. 
3 Signed by President Nelson Mandela in 1997 and ratified on 7 January 2000. See African Union ‘List 
of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child’ https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-rights-and-welfare-child accessed 20 November 
2019. 
4 Section 28, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 28 incorporates key provisions 
of the CRC: Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s Rights in the South African Courts: An Overview since 
Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2002) 10 Intl J Child Rts 137 at 139. 
5 Section 28(2), Constitution. South African law implemented the best interests principle in the 1940s 
but only in relation to family and welfare cases: Skelton ‘Chapter 11: Constitutional protection of 
children’s rights’ in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2017) at 345. 
6 Freeman ‘Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously’ (1992) 6(1) Int’l J of Law, Policy and the Family 
52 at 54. See also Walsh ‘Advancing the Interests of South Africa’s Children: A Look at the Best 
Interests of Children Under South Africa’s Children’s Act’ (2011) 19 Mich St U Coll LJ Int’l L 201 at 
215. 
7 Per Pollock and Maitland, early English law recognised infants only in their instrumental value as 
heirs: ‘The law had not even been careful to give the father a right to the custody of his children; on the 
other hand, it had given him a right to the custody of his heir apparent, whose marriage he was free to 
sell.’ Eekelaar (n 1) 163.  
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protection as legal rights. Children’s rights encompass both their need for protection 
and their right to autonomy.8 In the celebrated words of Justice Sachs, in contemporary 
South Africa every child is to be ‘constitutionally imagined’ as an individual with 
inherent dignity, ‘not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach full size’ or ‘a mere 
extension of his or her parents, umbilically destined to sink or swim with them.’9  
Reflecting the progression of children’s rights, today it is possible to study ‘child law’ 
in South Africa as an ‘autonomous discipline encompassing both private and public 
law.’10 Children’s rights reconfigure both the ‘public’ relationship between the state 
and children and the status of children within the ‘private’ sphere of the family—
unsettling law’s traditional private/public dichotomy.11 Umbrella children’s 
legislation enacted in 2005 introduced changes to South Africa’s legal lexicon that 
elevate children’s interests within the parent-child relationship.12 For example, 
‘parental responsibilities and rights’ has replaced traditional common law concepts of 
‘parental authority’ and ‘parental power.’13 Pieterse proposes that the 
constitutionalisation of children’s rights ‘requires that parental rights and entitlements 
be seen as flowing from their constitutional responsibilities towards children, and that 
fulfilling such responsibilities and exercising the concomitant rights are viewed as 
necessary prerequisites for the meaningful exercise by children of their constitutional 
rights.’14   
A child-focused shift is evident in South Africa’s maintenance law. Whereas 
maintenance was once viewed as a women’s issue (i.e. a mother’s claim against the 
father), the legislature and the Constitutional Court have now firmly established 
 
8 Skelton 2017 (n 5) 341. The law’s historical treatment of children as ‘passive objects of protection’ 
means that modern children’s rights are primarily associated with autonomy-enhancing rights, e.g. the 
right to participate in legal proceedings: Vandenhole ‘Chapter 2: Children’s rights from a legal 
perspective’ in Vandenhole, Desmet, Reynaert et al (eds) Routledge International Handbook of 
Children's Rights Studies (2015) at 50-1. 
9 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) para 18. 
10 Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2009) Preface. The publication to date of two editions of 
Boezaart’s treatise Child Law in South Africa (2009 and 2017), and its 2000 predecessor Introduction 
to Child Law in South Africa, underscores this point.  
11 Pieterse argues that some interpretations of children’s rights have reinforced the neo-liberal emphasis 
on private welfare responsibility and justified contraction of the state’s obligations towards children: 
Pieterse ‘Reconstructing the Private/Public Dichotomy - The Enforcement of Children's Constitutional 
Social Rights and Care Entitlements’ 2003 J of SA L 1.  
12 Children’s Act 38 of 2005.  
13 Heaton ‘Chapter 3: Parental responsibilities and rights (ss 18-41)’ in Davel & Skelton (eds) 
Commentary on the Children’s Act (looseleaf, updated to August 2019) Introduction.  
14 Pieterse (n 11) 7. 
   
 
   
 
6 
maintenance as a children’s issue.15 The preamble to the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
explicitly references South Africa’s CRC obligations and its commitment ‘to give high 
priority to the rights of children.’  
However, despite increased recognition that maintenance in the circumstances of 
parental absence and family dissolution directly implicates children’s rights, virtually 
no attention has been paid to maintenance in the circumstance of parental death as a 
children’s rights issue. This contribution seeks to fill this gap. Just as a child’s 
economic vulnerability typically increases upon family dissolution, the same occurs 
when a parent or caregiver dies, exacerbating the psycho-emotional vulnerability. The 
child’s need for maintenance persists and may even increase, but the source of 
maintenance instantly changes, from a living payor to the property left by that payor, 
if any. Death instantly activates new legal rules, moving the applicable framework 
from family law to succession law and introducing new processes and actors (e.g. 
Master of the High Court, executors, trustees, guardians, pension administrators). This 
change in legal framework may in itself pose a barrier to children’s access to 
maintenance.  
This contribution considers South Africa’s laws of succession from a children’s rights 
perspective. Placing the child’s economic security at the centre of the enquiry, a 
deliberate connection is drawn between the legal regimes of maintenance and 
succession. Succession is broadly defined to include sources of private economic 
support that may become available upon the death of a parent, including pension 
benefits and monies secured through a maintenance claim brought against an estate.16  
 
15 Moodley ‘Maintenance as a child’s rights issue—an analysis of recent decisions that give substance 
to the ‘best interests of the child standard’’ in Sloth-Nielsen & Du Toit (eds) Trials & Tribulations, 
Trends & Triumphs: Developments in International, African and South African Child and Family Law 
(2008) at 188. Moodley reviews the codification of the child’s right to maintenance in the Maintenance 
Act 99 of 1998 and the Constitutional Court’s decision in Bannatyne v Bannatyne and the Commission 
for Gender Equality (Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) (Bannatyne). The Court in Bannatyne did 
not lose sight of the gendered dimension of maintenance, recognising that enforcing maintenance ‘not 
only secures the rights of children, it also upholds the dignity of women and promotes... equality and 
non-sexism’ (para 30). 
16 Other sources include life policy proceeds and delictual damages for loss of support. Due to space 
constraints, these sources will not be reviewed here. Additionally, children may be entitled to public 
forms of support, such as cash grants payable to caregivers, discussed in Kruger ‘Chapter 2: 
Maintenance for children’ in  Boezaart 2017 (n 5) 41. The Child Support Grant has been the subject of 
significant research and commentary; see, e.g., Lund Changing Social Policy: The Child Support Grant 
in South Africa (2008), Patel, Knijn & Van Wel ‘Child Support Grants in South Africa: A Pathway to 
Women’s Empowerment and Child Well-being?’ (2015) 44 J of Social Policy 377, Grinspun ‘No small 
   
 
   
 
7 
The first two chapters set the social and legal backdrop. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
overview of the social and economic context of children and families in South Africa 
today, focusing on aspects most pertinent to children’s rights in maintenance and 
succession. Chapter 3 provides the legal context. The first half outlines the 
international, regional and domestic legal frameworks governing maintenance and 
reviews the progression of maintenance law reform in South Africa. It will be 
contended that children’s right to maintenance is one component of a broader right to 
economic security that binds both the state and parents. Since children’s right to 
economic security persists beyond parental death, succession law must be understood 
as a domain that directly engages this right. Some implications of the African child’s 
duty to provide support will be considered. The second half of Chapter 3 reviews South 
Africa’s laws of minority and guardianship, which regulate the scope of children’s 
autonomy within the legal system and the parent-child relationship. Incongruencies 
between the guardianship schemes in the 2005 Children’s Act and the Administration 
of Estates Act 66 of 1965  will be examined. Having shown that the law grants 
guardians significant power to alter children’s legal and economic positions, the 
chapter concludes by considering the standard of care expected of guardians and the 
remedies available to children.   
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 turn to an examination of the rights of children in South Africa’s 
laws of succession. Chapter 4 begins by outlining the children’s substantive rights in 
testate and intestate succession, before turning to an inspection of the procedural 
mechanisms designed to secure children’s interests in estates. Generally, executors’ 
and guardians’ actions are controlled through oversight by the Master’s office and the 
High Court, the requirement of security, and the institution of the Guardian’s Fund. 
Owing to their legal incapacity, children depend on guardians to represent and protect 
their interests in estates. Potential gaps in protection are identified.  
More and more, a pension is one of the most valuable assets a person owns upon death. 
Chapter 5 examines the law of pension death benefits from a children’s rights 
perspective. Under section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, pension boards 
 
change: The multiple impacts of the Child Support Grant on child and adolescent well-being’ in Delany, 
Jehoma & Lake (eds) South African Child Gauge 2016 (Child Gauge 2016), available at 
http://www.ci.uct.ac.za/ci/child-gauge/2016, accessed 16 July 2019, and Hall & Skelton ‘Introducing 
the Child Support Grant top-up for orphaned children living with family members’ in Child Gauge 
2016. This dissertation focuses on private sources of support.  
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are charged with distributing death benefits to the beneficiaries and dependants of fund 
members. Boards’ decisions are reviewable by the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
(‘Adjudicator’). It will be argued that the Adjudicator’s decisions evince a ‘parental 
power’ approach to guardianship that is untenable within a children’s rights paradigm. 
The approach of courts in maintenance cases involving the pensions of living payors 
will be reviewed in contrast, and reasons the ‘parental power’ conception of 
guardianship persists will be considered. Finally, the case will be made for pension 
death benefits to be paid periodically to minors’ guardians.  
It is long-established in South African law that children may claim maintenance from 
their parents’ estates. Chapter 6 examines the substantive and procedural aspects of 
this common law right, identifies current weaknesses, and suggests ways to enhance 
the right’s furtherance of children’s economic security. 
The concluding chapter reviews the findings and recommendations made in the 
dissertation. Having demonstrated the law’s reliance on the institution of guardianship 
to give effect to children’s rights in succession, the need to reform guardianship in 
conformity with modern children’s rights norms is reiterated.  
  
   
 




SOCIAL CONTEXT: Families, Orphans and Child Poverty in South Africa 
There are 19.6 million children under 18 years old in South Africa, constituting 35% 
of the total population.17 A phenomenon that distinguishes South Africa 
internationally is the low rate of parental co-residence with biological children.18 
While in all other countries in the world, children are more likely than not to live with 
both of their parents, in South Africa, only 34.4% of children live with both parents, 
and 20.9% live with neither parent.19 41.4% live with their mother only.20 Parental 
absence does not necessarily indicate neglect, given the significant child-rearing role 
assumed by kin in African families: almost all children in South Africa live with at 
least one adult, and the vast majority live with two or more adults.21 Of the 4.1 million 
children who lived with neither parent, almost all lived with kin.22  
Household composition in South Africa is characterised by ‘fluidity, mobility and 
dispersion’23 for reasons cultural and historical. Hall and Richter observe that  
‘it has always been common […] for children to spend time at the home of 
their grandparents as a way of strengthening family attachments and 
intergenerational learning, as well as to provide companionship and draw on 
the capacity of non-working family members to provide care and support.’24 
At the same time, the contribution of colonial and apartheid policies to the 
fragmentation and disruption of non-White families in South Africa is undeniable, 
 
17 Based on mid-2017 government statistics: Hall & Sambu ‘Demography of South Africa’s Children’ 
in Hall et al (eds) South African Child Gauge 2018 (Child Gauge 2018), available at 
http://www.ci.uct.ac.za/ci/child-gauge/2018, accessed 11 March 2019 at 132. The Children’s Institute 
at the University of Cape Town analyses government statistics to produce child-centred data on a range 
of indicators including care arrangements, abuse and protection, income poverty and social grants, 
education, health and nutrition, housing and basic services: Children’s Institute ‘Welcome to Children 
Count’ http://childrencount.uct.ac.za/, accessed 26 November 2019.  
18 Hall & Richter ‘Introduction: Children, families and the state’ in Child Gauge 2018 (n 17) 25. 
19 Based on 2017 data: Hall & Sambu (n 17) 133. South Africa is an outlier ‘even by African standards’ 
when it comes to its high rate of parental absence from children’s households: Hall & Richter (n 18) 
25. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid 133. 
22 Hall & Mokomane ‘The shape of children’s families and households: A demographic overview’ in 
Child Gauge 2018 (n 17) 33. 
23 Clark ‘Child Maintenance and the Role of the South African State’ (2000) 8 Intl J Child Rts 307 at 
307. 
24 Hall & Richter (n 18) 25-6.  
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with the most severe and lasting effects felt in African families and households.25 
Contemporary reasons for parental absence from children’s households, some of 
which are traceable to the effects of pre-apartheid and apartheid policies, include  
‘non-marital childbearing, adult employment strategies and labour migration, 
urban housing constraints, limited availability of affordable care, schooling 
opportunities, choices about who is best placed to provide care for children, 
divorce or separation, and any combination of these.’26 
Parental absence may also result from death. The Children’s Institute classifies 
orphans into three mutually exclusive categories. A ‘maternal orphan’ has a deceased 
mother and a living father; a ‘paternal orphan’ has a deceased father and a living 
mother; a ‘double orphan’ has two deceased parents.27 In 2017, there were 2.8 million 
orphans in South Africa, of whom 505,000 were double orphans.28 There were three 
times as many paternal orphans as maternal orphans.29 The majority of orphans are 
cared for by adult relatives despite significant financial constraints.30 The Children’s 
Institute observes that ‘the poorest households carry the greatest burden of care for 
orphans. Close to half (49%) of all orphans are resident in the poorest 20% of 
households.’31 In 2017, 65% (12.8 million) of all children lived below the ‘upper-
bound’ poverty line, the official measure marking the minimum resources required to 
meet basic nutritional and other essential needs.32 
Connected to poverty, chronically high unemployment in South Africa undermines 
children’s economic security.33 The Children’s Institute reports that in 2017, 30% (5.9 
 
25 Among the policies implemented to disrupt and restrict the family and economic lives of African, 
coloured and Indian communities were labour force segregation, land dispossession, land ownership 
segregation, migrant labour, influx control and the homeland system: Report of the Lund Committee on 
Child and Family Support (1996) 15-6, and Hall & Richter (n 18) 26.  
26 Hall & Mokomane (n 22) 39.  
27 Hall & Sambu (n 17) 134.  
28 Ibid. 
29 1,728,000 paternal orphans and 530,000 maternal orphans: Hall & Sambu (n 17) 134. 
30 Hall & Mokomane (n 22) 36. In light of the diversity of family forms and household structures in 
South Africa, it should be remembered that children who do not live with their parents are not 
necessarily orphans. 
31 Hall & Sambu (n 17) 135. 
32 Hall & Sambu ‘Income poverty, unemployment and social grants’ in Child Gauge 2018 (n 17) at 
137. 
33 Statistics South Africa reported an official unemployment rate of 29.1% in the third quarter of 2019: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2019.pdf accessed 27 November 
2019. Since Statistics South Africa defines the labour force to include persons ages 15 to 64, youth 
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million) of South African children lived in households with no working adults.34 Adult 
employment yields benefits to children beyond household income, such as health 
insurance, unemployment insurance and parental leave.35 Besides enabling parents to 
support their children, employment provides the opportunity to accumulate assets and 
savings for their future maintenance in the event of parental death. The effective 
mobilisation of private sources of wealth for the maintenance of orphans is all the 
more crucial given the extensive need for and finitude of public resources.  
  
 
between ages 15 to 18 are captured by this figure. Inability to encounter work prevents youth from 
becoming self-sufficient, prolonging their dependency on family and the state.  
34 Hall & Sambu (n 32) 139.  
35 Hall & Sambu (n 32) 139. 
   
 





3.1. Establishing Children’s Right to Economic Security  
The following subsections will review the international, regional and domestic laws 
that entrench maintenance as a child’s right, and the efforts undertaken to reform South 
Africa’s maintenance system. It will be argued that the right to maintenance is one 
component of children’s broader right to economic security, the responsibility for 
which rests on parents and the state. The child’s duty to provide support will be 
introduced, with its implications for children’s right to support in succession will be 
inspected in subsequent chapters.  
3.1.1. Children’s Right to Maintenance and Economic Security in International 
Law 
International and South African law proclaim that children grow up best in families. 
The preamble to the CRC states inter alia:  
‘Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly 
children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it 
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,  
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or 
her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding….’ 
Correspondingly, the CRC mandates state parties to respect the role of family in 
rearing children. Article 7 frames parental care as a child’s right: every child has the 
right ‘to know and be cared for by his or her parents.’ Article 5 obliges states to respect 
the responsibilities, rights and duties of family and community members in their 
provision of ‘appropriate direction and guidance’ to the child.  
South Africa is also a state party to the ACRWC, the world’s only regional children’s 
rights treaty. The ACRWC was developed to complement the CRC while accounting 
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for ‘regional specificities,’36 including ‘the heightened importance of family to the 
African child,’37 the distinct role of children within African families and 
communities,38 and the importance of the extended family in child-rearing.39 Like the 
CRC, the ACRWC preamble stresses the importance of family to a child’s upbringing:  
‘RECOGNIZING that the child occupies a unique and privileged position in 
the African society and that for the full and harmonious development of his 
personality, the child should grow up in a family environment in an atmosphere 
of happiness, love and understanding….’ 
Further echoing the CRC preamble, Article 18(1) of the ACRWC deems the family to 
be ‘the natural unit and basis of society,’ and obliges state parties to protect and 
support the establishment and development of the family. Article 19 stipulates that 
every child is entitled to the ‘enjoyment of parental care and protection.’ Both the CRC 
and the ACRWC enshrine the ‘best interests of the child’ as a guiding legal principle 
for all decisions affecting children.40 Where the CRC requires that the best interests of 
the child be ‘a primary consideration’ in decision-making,41 the ACRWC requires that 
it be ‘the primary consideration.’42 South Africa is required to implement the 
ACRWC’s higher standard.43 
The sphere of autonomy afforded to the family in the child rights treaties implies 
corresponding duties on the part of family members. Parents bear the ‘primary 
responsibility’ for their children’s upbringing and development,44 which includes the 
 
36 Sloth-Nielsen ‘Chapter 15: Children’s Rights Litigation in the African Region: Lessons from the 
Communications Procedure Under the ACRWC’ in Liefaard & Doek (eds) Litigating the Rights of the 
Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and International Jurisprudence 
(2015) at 251.  
37 Binford ‘The constitutionalization of children's rights in South Africa’ (2016) 60 New York Law 
School LR 333 at 341. 
38 Sloth-Nielsen 2015 (n 36) 251.  
39 Kaime The Convention on the Rights of the Child: a cultural legitimacy critique (2011) at 25. 
40 The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) interprets the child’s best interests as a 
threefold concept: a substantive right, an interpretive legal principle, and a rule of procedure for all 
decision-making that affects a specific child, an identified group of children or children in general, 
depending on the case in question. See Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘General comment No. 
14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 
3, para. 1)’ CRC/C/GC/14 para 6.  
41 Article 3(1) CRC.  
42 Article 4(1) ACRWC.  
43 Both the ACRWC (Article 1(2)) and the CRC (Article 41) require state parties to respect provisions 
that are more conducive to the realisation of children’s rights, whether contained in domestic or 
international law. 
44 Article 18(1) CRC and Article 20(1) ACRWC.  
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responsibility ‘to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions 
of living necessary for the child’s development.’45 States’ duties are secondary and 
supplemental to parental duties. In child-rearing, the state’s role is to ‘render 
appropriate assistance’ to parents and other guardians.46 As for ensuring children an 
adequate standard of living, state parties are to provide material assistance and support 
programmes to parents only ‘in case of need.’47  
Two additional provisions in the CRC (with no parallels in the ACRWC) allocate the 
primary responsibility for children’s financial support to parents. First, Article 26(2) 
suggests that the state’s provision of social security benefits to children may be 
circumscribed by the parental duty of maintenance:   
‘The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, taking into account the 
resources and the circumstances of the child and persons having responsibility 
for the maintenance of the child, as well as any other consideration relevant to 
an application for benefits made by or on behalf of the child.’ [Emphasis 
added] 
Secondly, Article 27(4) requires states to ‘take all appropriate measures to secure the 
recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having 
financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad.’48  
The foregoing provisions emphasise parents’ primary financial duty for raising their 
children. States are to enforce performance of that duty and to provide assistance in 
circumstances of need.49 In this dissertation, the right to ‘economic security’ is used 
to describe children’s right to the resources and conditions necessary for their 
 
45 Article 27(2) CRC, Article 20(1)(b) ACRWC. 
46 Article 18(2) CRC, Article 20(2)(b) ACRWC.  
47 Article 27(3) CRC, Article 20(2)(a) ACRWC. The travaux preparatoires of the CRC confirm that 
the intended objective and scope of Article 27 is to allocate primary responsibility to parents: Sharon 
Detrick A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1999) at 459-60. 
48 To date, Burkina Faso is the only African country to have signed (not ratified) the Hague Convention 
of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance. See Hague Conference on Private International Law ‘Status Table, Convention of 23 
November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance’ https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=131, accessed 25 
November 2019. 
49 Detrick (n 47) 466; Eide ‘Article 27: The right to an adequate standard of living’ in Alen, Vande 
Lanotte, Verhellen et al (eds) A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (2006) §3-5. 
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upbringing and development, whether the duty-bearer is the state, parents or others. It 
is submitted that the existence of such a right is plainly established in the CRC and the 
ACRWC. The right to maintenance refers more narrowly to the economic support that 
parents and other relatives are obligated to provide.  
The right to economic security centres the child as the right-holder instead of the 
identities or capacities of the duty-bearers. The relevant life is that of the child, not the 
parent’s; thus, the child’s economic security must be secured before, after, and despite 
a parent’s death. This seemingly over-scrupulous point is important, given that the 
child rights treaties do not appear to extend the duty of maintenance beyond a payor’s 
life. While the CRC and ACRWC address the duty of child maintenance in a range of 
circumstances—separation and divorce,50 parents living abroad,51 and children born 
outside of marriage52—they are silent on the duty of maintenance for orphaned 
children. Scholarly commentaries interpreting the parental responsibility provisions in 
the CRC and ACRWC similarly presuppose living parents.53  
Under international law, therefore, it appears that children only enjoy the right to 
maintenance from living relatives. There is no parental duty to make financial 
provision for children upon death, nor state duty to implement systems for 
maintenance recovery from deceased estates. International law’s agnostic position 
towards the duty of maintenance in death stands in contrast to the domestic laws of 
many jurisdictions, including South Africa, which expect decedents to make provision 
for their dependants.  
This chapter now turns to a consideration of children’s rights in South Africa’s 
Constitution and the evolution of the law of maintenance.  
 
50 Article 27(4) CRC, Article 18(2) ACRWC. 
51 Article 27(4) CRC. 
52 Article 18(3) of the ACRWC stipulates that ‘no child shall be deprived of maintenance by reference 
to the parents’ marital status.’  
53 E.g. Eide (n 49), Detrick (n 47) 464-6. In its third General Comment (CRC/GC/2003/3), the CRC 
Committee elaborated on the state’s obligations under Article 27 towards children orphaned by 
HIV/AIDS, but not parents’ obligations.  
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3.1.2. Children’s Rights in the Constitution and the Grootboom Decision 
Children enjoy all rights contained in the Bill of Rights except the rights to vote and 
to stand for public office.54 Section 28 enshrines additional child-specific rights. The 
inclusion of section 28 marked ‘the first time that children’s rights were robustly and 
comprehensively recognized in the express language of a nation’s Constitution.’55 The 
CRC’s influence is evident.56 Section 28 ‘constitutionalises’ major features of the 
CRC, establishing the treaty’s authority in South African law.57 Section 28(2) 
stipulates that a child’s best interests are of ‘paramount importance’ in every matter 
concerning the child. This standard is interpreted as exceeding what is required under 
the CRC and the ACRWC.58 While the best interests of the child principle existed in 
South African law before the CRC and the Constitution,59 section 28(2) has extended 
its field of application beyond family law to all matters concerning children.60  
Of relevance to the right to economic security, section 28 enshrines children’s right to 
parental or family care and to ‘to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and 
social services.’61 The interplay between children’s rights to parental care and to 
shelter, and the allocation of duties between parents and the state, were addressed in 
the ground-breaking Constitutional Court decision in Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom (Grootboom).62  
The case involved the eviction of a group of families, numbering 510 children and 390 
adults, from their informal homes on a tract of private land.63 Rendered homeless, the 
families sought a court order requiring the State to provide them with adequate shelter 
 
54 Currie & de Waal (eds) The Bill of Rights handbook 5th ed (2005) 600. 
55 Binford (n 37) 334.  
56 During the constitution drafting process, the CRC was cited in the submissions of civil society and 
political groups and relied upon by the section 28 drafting committee: Skelton ‘Chapter 2: South Africa’ 
in Liefaard & Doek (n 36) at 14-5. 
57 Sloth-Nielsen 2002 (n 4) 139. Further, sections 39(1)(b) and 233 of the Constitution require courts to 
interpret the Bill of Rights and legislation in a manner consistent with international law.  
58 Heaton ‘An individualised, contextualised and child-centred determination of the child’s best 
interests, and the implications of such an approach in the South African context’ (2009) 34(2) J for 
Juridical Science 1 at 4. 
59 Binford (n 37) states at fn 100 that the best interests criterion had been an established principle in 
South African family law and dependency cases since the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130 
(A). In an even earlier case, Cronje v Cronje 1907 TS 871, the appellate court stated that the main 
consideration in a custody dispute was the best interests of the children: Walsh (n 6) at 215-6. 
60 Heaton 2009 (n 58) 3.  
61 Section 28(1) (b) and (c), Constitution. 
62 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
63 Grootboom (n 62) para 4. 
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along with access to water and sanitation until they obtained more permanent 
housing.64 The Bill of Rights guarantees everyone access to adequate housing, subject 
to the qualification that ‘the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.’65 
The High Court granted relief to the applicants based not on the right of everyone to 
housing in section 26, but on the right of children to shelter in section 28, finding that 
section 28(1)(c) obliged the State to provide basic shelter to children if their parents 
were unable to do so.66 The High Court recognised that unlike section 26, ‘section 
28(1)(c) is drafted as an unqualified constitutional right.’67 As it was not in the 
children's best interests to be separated from their parents, the High Court ruled that 
the State needed to provide shelter ‘of such a nature that the parents may join their 
children.’68 
All levels of government affected by the High Court order appealed.69 While it was 
held that the State had breached the applicants’ section 26(2) rights,70 it is the 
Constitutional Court’s overturning of the High Court’s interpretation of section 28 that 
warrants discussion here.  
In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court scrutinised the ‘anomalous result’ 
produced by the High Court’s reasoning, which had the effect of granting parents with 
minor children an ‘on demand’ right to shelter under section 28(1)(c), while childless 
adults, no matter how needy, would only enjoy the qualified right to housing under 
section 26.71 The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that section 28’s 
unqualified framing made children’s socio-economic rights directly enforceable 
against the State, finding that such an interpretation would undermine the ‘carefully 
constructed constitutional scheme for progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights.’72 The Court ruled that the socio-economic rights in section 28(1)(c) must be 
 
64 Ibid. 
65 Section 26(1) and (2), Constitution. 
66 At a minimum, shelter was to include tents, portable latrines and a regular supply of water: 
Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) at 295.  
67 Ibid 292.  
68 Ibid 293.  
69 Grootboom (n 62) para 4.  
70 The State’s failure to address the situation of those in most desperate need of housing fell short of the 
threshold of ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ required by section 26(2): Grootboom (n 62) 
para 69. 
71 Ibid para 71. 
72 Ibid paras 71-2.  
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interpreted in light of the child’s right to family and parental care in section 28(1)(b). 
Section 28(1)(c) describes the scope of care to which children are entitled, while 
section 28(1)(b) defines those with primary responsibility for providing that care: 
parents and families.73 The Court ruled definitively that the State does not have a 
primary obligation to provide shelter to children who are in the care of their parents 
or families.74 Rather, the State’s obligation towards such children is limited to 
providing ‘the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary’ to ensure their rights, 
which ‘would normally be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement 
mechanisms for the maintenance of children, their protection from maltreatment, 
abuse, neglect or degradation, and the prevention of other forms of abuse.’75  
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court consolidated the principle that parents bear 
primary responsibility for their children’s economic needs, with the State’s obligation 
being secondary and supplementary. The judgment dispelled prior hopes that section 
28 put children in South Africa in a stronger position than adults to claim socio-
economic entitlements against the State. The Grootboom decision has been roundly 
criticised for rendering the inclusion of section 28(1)(c) in the Constitution ‘almost 
entirely without purpose.’76  
Since, under both international treaty and domestic constitutional law, the 
responsibility for children’s economic needs rests first and foremost on parents, 
maintenance is of vital importance to children’s economic security. It is to the law of 
child maintenance that this Chapter now turns.  
 
73 Ibid paras 76-7. Sloth-Nielsen points out the Court’s strained logic when it comes to the final 
entitlement listed in section 28(1)(c), social services. While the parental duty of support may reasonably 
comprise nutrition, shelter and health care, ‘it is only on a strained reading that one could view the 
common law duty of support of parents towards their children as encompassing the provision of social 
services’: Sloth-Nielsen ‘The Child’s Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, and Primary 
Prevention of Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 210 
at 225-6.  
74 Grootboom (n 62) para 77. 
75 Ibid para 78. 
76 Pieterse (n 11) 11.  
   
 
   
 
19 
3.1.3. Reform of Child Maintenance Law  
South Africa is in the middle of a decades-long reform of its maintenance law. In 1996, 
the committee commissioned to investigate child support policy options offered up 
this grim prognosis:  
‘The [parental maintenance] system functions so poorly that the government 
is unwittingly signalling that financial responsibility by parents for their 
children is not the main option for child support.’77  
An issue paper by the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) in 1997 
recognised that poor enforcement of parents’ maintenance obligations directly strained 
the social welfare system.78 The issue paper attributed ineffective enforcement to a 
‘low measure of social disapproval’ towards defaulters and inimical attitudes within 
the legal system, where attorneys, prosecutors and magistrates did not regard 
maintenance cases as important or worthy of their time.79  
The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998, which repealed the Maintenance Act 23 of 1963, 
sets out a scheme for the granting and enforcement of maintenance orders, including 
civil and criminal remedies.80 One of the Maintenance Act’s main innovations is the 
introduction of maintenance investigators empowered to investigate complaints and 
gather evidence relating to maintenance.81 The preamble to the Maintenance Act 
signals a commitment to treat maintenance as a child’s right and to align the law of 
maintenance recovery with international standards, explicitly acknowledging that ‘the 
recovery of maintenance in South Africa possibly falls short of the Republic’s 
international obligations in terms of [the CRC],’ and that the legislation constitutes 
only ‘a first step in the reform of the entire South African maintenance system.’82 
 
77 Lund Committee on Child and Family Support Report of the Lund Committee (n 25) 35. 
78 South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 5: Review of the Maintenance System (1997), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm, accessed 3 August 2019 at 39. 
79 Ibid 14, 16. 
80 The Maintenance Act applies to all persons who are under a legal duty to maintain any other person: 
section 2(1).  
81 Bannatyne (n 15) para 25; section 6 Maintenance Act.  
82 According to Wamhoff and Burman, when the Maintenance Act was enacted ‘there was no time for 
a basic rethinking of the whole system—political pressure required immediate action—so the proposals 
that emerged were rather attempts to prevent the worst abuses of the system and oil the enforcement 
machinery.’ Wamhoff & Burman ‘Parental maintenance for children: How the private maintenance 
system might be improved’ (2002) 28.2 Social Dynamics 146 at 148. 
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Nevertheless, it remains in force some 22 years hence.83 Amendments were introduced 
in 2015 to address some identified weaknesses in existing enforcement procedures.84 
Despite praise of the Maintenance Act as a ‘very comprehensive and thorough piece 
of legislation’85 that establishes clear procedures for the investigation and adjudication 
of complaints,86 it is widely felt that the maintenance administration system is 
under-resourced and functions poorly.87  
While the Maintenance Act regulates the procedural aspects of maintenance recovery, 
the parental duty of child maintenance originates in the common law.88 Early 
recognition of maintenance as a child’s right may be traced to the common law rule 
that a parent may not waive the maintenance claims of children.89 Some commentators 
have remarked that the inclusion of the duty of maintenance under the rubric of 
‘parental responsibilities and rights’ in the 2005 Children’s Act90 appears to detract 
from the common law position, which treated the duty of maintenance as separate 
from parental authority, such that persons deprived of parental authority (e.g. 
unmarried fathers and rapists) were still liable for maintenance.91 However, Schäfer 
argues that rather than displacing the common law maintenance duty, the Children’s 
Act has added a second statutory basis for imposing the duty on anyone who assumes 
parental responsibilities and rights.92 The formulation of parental duties in the 
Children’s Act reinforces the Grootboom ratio that the responsibility for children’s 
support rests primarily on parents.93 The scope of maintenance encompasses the 
 
83 Only in 2011 was the SALRC commissioned to review the Maintenance Act: Proudlock & Rohrs 
‘Recent Developments in Law and Policy Affecting Children’ in Child Gauge 2018 (n 17) 10. An issue 
paper was published in 2014: SALRC Issue Paper 28: Review of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
(2014), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm, accessed 16 July 2019. To date, no 
final report has been published. 
84 Maintenance Amendment Act 9 of 2015; Clark & Van Zyl Handbook of the South African Law of 
Maintenance 4th ed (2016) 63. 
85 Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) Preface. 
86 Proudlock & Rohrs (n 83) 10.  
87 Proudlock & Rohrs (n 83) 10; Bonthuys ‘Child Maintenance and Child Poverty in South Africa’ 
(2008) 71 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 194 at 196; Kruger (n 16) 62. 
88 Kruger (n 16) 43. Section 2(2) of the Maintenance Act provides that the Act ‘shall not be interpreted 
so as to derogate from the law relating to the liability of persons to maintain other persons.’ 
89 Skelton & Carnelley (eds) Family Law in South Africa (2010) §20.4.4.3, citing Shields v Shields 1946 
CPD 242. 
90 Sections 1(1) and 18(2), Children’s Act. 
91 Kruger (n 16) 39; Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives (2011) 
§8.4.4. 
92 Schäfer (n 91) §8.4.4. 
93 Bonthuys ‘Parental Rights and Responsibilities in the Children’s Bill 70D of 2003’ (2006) 17 
Stellenbosch L Rev 482 at 483. 
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necessities of life such as food, shelter, clothing, medical care and education, but is 
not confined to bare necessities only; the appropriate scope depends on the family’s 
standard of living.94  
The high rate of parental absence from children’s households, outlined in Chapter 2, 
means that at any given time, some 10 million children in South Africa have a living 
parent with whom they do not reside.95 Such parents are the main ‘targets’ of the 
maintenance enforcement system. Optimising maintenance recovery would generate 
inflows of funds from parents into a significant number of children’s households and 
reduce pressure on the social welfare system.  
Bonthuys cautions against overstating the potential of private maintenance to alleviate 
child poverty, pointing out that the fathers of the poorest children are least likely to be 
able to pay maintenance.96 She emphasises the constitutional dimension of the right to 
maintenance: 
‘We need to perceive children’s rights to maintenance not primarily as an 
individual right to be asserted against parents in the realm of private law, but 
as a constitutional public law right as against the community and that we 
should therefore focus equally on the system of social welfare in order to 
alleviate child poverty.’97 
Just as the traditional private/ public law divide is unsettled by children’s right to 
maintenance, it is submitted that the law’s compartmentalisation of children’s right to 
economic security into separate legal fields (e.g. succession, pension, insurance), with 
parental death made the pivotal event, betrays the law’s failure to be truly child 
rights-centred.   
 
94 Domingo & Barratt ‘Part 2: Family law – Chapter 2: Parent and child’ in Barratt (ed) Law of Persons 
and the Family 2nd ed (2017) 190. 
95 I arrive at this rough estimate by subtracting the total number of maternal, paternal and double 
orphans in South Africa (2.8 million) from the total number of children who do not reside with both 
parents (12.8 million), using figures cited in Chapter 2. This estimate is under-inclusive, because not 
all maternal and paternal orphans reside with their surviving parent.  
96 Bonthuys 2008 (n 87) 209. 
97 Bonthuys 2008 (n 87) 209.  
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3.1.4. The African Child’s Duty of Support and Reciprocal Support Duties  
The child’s right to maintenance must be appreciated together with the child’s duty to 
provide maintenance, a distinctly African concept, and the broader set of support 
obligations recognised in South African law.  
Article 31 of the ACRWC lists numerous responsibilities owed by African children to 
their families, society, the state, and various communities, including the responsibility 
‘to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at 
all times and to assist them in case of need.’ This duty to assist extends beyond but 
encompasses financial maintenance, and is qualified by the child’s age, abilities and 
evolving capacities.98 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur show that Article 31 is rooted in 
African tradition and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,99 and 
encapsulates an ‘African normative consensus on children’s rights.’100  
South African law has long recognised that children (both major and minor) owe a 
duty of support to their parents, grandparents and siblings, a duty grounded in filial 
piety.101 In fact, South African law imposes a reciprocal duty of support between 
ascendants and descendants ad infinitum, subject to the rule that support must first be 
sought from a nearer relation.102 A minor child’s duty to support a parent depends on 
the child’s financial ability and proof of indigence by the parent.103  
Echoing Article 31 of the ACRWC, the Children’s Act provides broadly that ‘every 
child has responsibilities appropriate to the child’s age and ability towards his or her 
family, community and the state,’ but does not elaborate on the nature or scope of 
 
98 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) General Comment 
on Article 31 (2017) paras 59, 61.   
99 Organization of African Unity (OAU) African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (27 June 
1981). 
100 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur ‘A Dutiful Child: The Implications of Article 31 of the African Children’s 
Charter’ (2008) 52(2) Journal of African Law 159 at 187.  
101 Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) at 14, citing as authorities Voet and case law dating to 1893.  
102 Clark ‘Chapter 10 – Duties of support of living persons’ in Van Heerden, Cockrell & Keightley (eds) 
Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 2nd ed (1999) at 234, 252 (Boberg’s). 
103 Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) 14. The case law is unsettled as to the level of need that constitutes 
‘indigence’: Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) 14-5 and Kruger (n 16) 49. 
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those responsibilities.104 Commentaries on the section are laconic; none suggests that 
it modifies the common law position.105  
In addition to the duty to support others, South African law has historically expected 
minors with means to support themselves. Indeed, some commentators present the 
duty of self-support as one that precedes and qualifies the parental duty of support:   
‘Children who have the means to support themselves cannot require their 
parents to do so; the parents are entitled to apply the children’s income to their 
maintenance before using their own resources for the purpose.’106 
The scope of children’s duties of support has evident implications for children’s right 
to economic security in succession. Whether modern authorities like the CRC, 
ACRWC, Bill of Rights and the Grootboom decision, with their emphasis on state and 
parental responsibility for children’s support, have contracted children’s duties of 
support to any extent has not been the subject of commentary.  
3.2. Legal Capacity of Minors and Guardianship in South African Law 
The following subsections review the laws of legal minority and guardianship in South 
Africa. Guardianship enables minors to enter into binding transactions and participate 
in legal proceedings despite their incapacities at law. As will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters, it is primarily through the institution of guardianship that 
children’s rights are effectuated in succession.  
3.2.1. Legal Capacity of Minors  
Under South African law, all persons have legal capacity—the capacity to have rights 
and obligations.107 The extent of that capacity may be limited due to various factors, 
a significant one being age.108 Legal capacity has three components: the capacity to be 
held accountable for crimes and delicts, the capacity to perform juristic acts, and the 
 
104 Section 16, Children’s Act.  
105 E.g. Boezaart ‘Chapter 2: General principles (ss 6-17)’ in Davel & Skelton (n 13) §16. A Juta Law 
Online search found this section had not been judicially considered in any reported decision as of 21 
January 2020.  
106 Clark ‘Chapter 10’ (n 102) 245-6. See also Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19 – Personal and proprietary 
aspects of the parental power’ in Boberg’s (n 102) 707. 
107 Heaton & Roos Family and Succession Law in South Africa (2012) at 45. 
108 Ibid 45.  
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capacity to litigate.109 This dissertation will focus on the latter two capacities, which 
are most relevant to succession.  
South African law confers differential legal status and capacities on children based on 
age.110 All children have the legal capacity to own both moveable and immoveable 
property.111 A child under the age of 7 is an infans with no personal capacity to perform 
juristic acts,112 to transfer ownership in property,113 or to sue or be sued in their own 
name.114 A parent or guardian must conclude a contract or enact a property transfer on 
behalf of an infans and represent an infans in a lawsuit.115 Rights or duties arising from 
the contract, transfer or court order accrue to the infans and not the guardian.116  
Minors age 7 and older enjoy some capacity to perform juristic acts. They can improve 
their legal position (i.e. acquire rights or terminate duties) without a guardian’s 
assistance but generally cannot worsen their legal position (i.e. acquire duties or 
relinquish rights) without a guardian’s assistance.117 These two principles govern 
minors’ capacities to contract and to acquire and alienate property.118 Unassisted, a 
minor can only enter into contracts that confer rights and impose no obligations.119 
Assistance may take the form of a guardian entering an agreement on a minor’s behalf 
or consenting to a contract that a minor enters personally.120 In the latter case, consent 
must be informed, which requires the guardian having knowledge of the contract’s 
material terms and the surrounding circumstances.121 Barratt observes that the law is 
 
109 Ibid 45.  
110 Section 17 of the Children’s Act reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18 years, effective 1 July 
2007, bringing minority in South African law in line with the CRC and ACRWC, as well as the 
definition of ‘child’ in section 28(3) of the Constitution: ibid at 41.  
111 Van Heerden traces children’s ability to own property to the decline of fathers’ authority in Roman-
Dutch law: ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 686-7. 
112 Boezaart Law of Persons 6th ed (2016) §4.4.2.  
113 Barratt ‘Part 1: Law of persons – Chapter 4: Minority’ in Barratt (n 94) 62. 
114 Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §4.4.2. 
115 Barratt (n 113) 43, 63, 74.  
116 Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §4.4.2.  
117 Barratt (n 113) 42. Statutes govern minors’ capacity to perform specific juristic acts, e.g., minors 
over age 16 may make a will unassisted, and minors over 14 can be witnesses to a will (sections 4 & 1 
Wills Act 7 of 1953): Barratt (n 113) 71. 
118 Ibid 43-4, 62-3.  
119 Ibid 44.  
120 Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §4.5.2.2.1.  
121 Barratt (n 113) 44.  
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‘not overly particular’ about the timing or form of assistance.122 Once assisted, the 
minor incurs full contractual liability.123 
Under South African law, the capacity to acquire or alienate property is distinct from 
the capacity to contract.124 Transfer of ownership does not depend on the existence of 
a valid contract, but on the fact of delivery and the existence of a ‘real agreement’ 
whereby the transferor and transferee each have the intention of passing ownership.125 
A minor may accept ownership (i.e. acquire a benefit) unassisted but cannot transfer 
ownership without a guardian’s assistance.126 Specific legislated requirements apply 
to dealing with minors’ immovable property.127  
In litigation, a minor may be represented by a guardian or may litigate in their own 
name with a guardian’s assistance.128 In either case, the legal consequences arising 
from the action bind the minor, not the guardian.129 The minor bears the costs of 
litigation unless the court finds that the guardian acted unreasonably.130  
As seen, guardianship is used to ‘overcome’ children’s legal incapacities. A guardian 
is empowered to significantly alter a child’s legal position. The following subsection 
reviews the legal framework for the assumption of guardianship and recent changes to 
guardianship law.  
3.2.2. The Evolution of Guardianship 
At common law, ‘guardianship’ carries a wide and a narrow meaning.131 The wider 
meaning equates guardianship with parental authority over the child’s property and 
person (i.e. custody) and is synonymous with ‘natural guardianship.’132 Guardianship 
 
122 Ibid.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid 63. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid 64. 
127 All co-guardians must consent to the alienation or encumbrance of a child’s immovable property: 
section 18(3)(c)(v) Children’s Act. Approval of transactions by either the High Court or the Master of 
the High Court is required: section 80 Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. 
128 Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §4.5.3.2. In limited circumstances a minor may have full capacity to litigate, 
e.g. when a claim is brought against a minor for the maintenance of his child: Boezaart 2016 (n 112) 
§4.5.3.1.  
129 Ibid.  
130 Ibid. 
131 Heaton (n 13) §18. 
132 Van Heerden ‘Chapter 14 – How the parental power is acquired and lost’ in Boberg’s (n 102) fn3. 
Schäfer contends that natural guardianship was ‘adopted unnecessarily from English common law,’ 
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in the narrow sense means the capacity to administer a minor’s property and to assist 
a minor in legal proceedings and in performing juristic acts.133 The Children’s Act 
codifies the narrow meaning of guardianship.134  
Under Roman-Dutch and English law, a father’s rights to a legitimate child were 
superior to a mother’s, the father being regarded as a child’s primary protector.135 This 
position prevailed in South African law until the enactment of the Guardianship Act 
192 of 1993, the purpose of which was to establish the equal guardianship of mothers 
and fathers and align domestic legislation with international obligations.136 The 
Guardianship Act established that both parents in a marriage had guardianship of their 
child, and each was competent to perform guardianship duties independent of the 
other, except for a specified list of acts that required joint consent.137 
Rather than altering children’s legal capacities, legislative changes to the law of 
guardianship have been aimed at establishing formal equality between parents, on the 
basis of gender in the Guardianship Act and marital status in the Children’s Act. The 
Children’s Act incorporates the Guardianship Act’s amendment,138 makes 
guardianship a component of ‘parental responsibilities and rights,’139 and allows 
unmarried biological fathers to automatically acquire the full complement of section 
18 parental responsibilities and rights if they meet certain conditions set out in section 
21(1).140 Previously, only biological mothers and married biological fathers obtained 
 
since Roman-Dutch law had already supplied South African law with a ‘unified concept of parental 
authority’: (n 91) §8.4.3.1.  
133 Heaton (n 13) §18. 
134 See section 18 of the Children’s Act. 
135 Walsh (n 6) 214. 
136 Namely, Article 16(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and Article 18(1) of the CRC: Van Heerden & Clark ‘Parenthood in South African Law - 
Equality and Independence - Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Guardianship’ (1995) 112 
SALJ 140 at 140.   
137 Sections 1(1) and 1(2), Guardianship Act; Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 687. Previously, the 
father’s word was determinative when there was a difference of opinion between the mother and father 
of a legitimate child: Van Heerden & Clark (n 136) 140. The Divorce Act 70 of 1979 and the 
Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 empower courts to make orders granting guardianship, including 
sole guardianship, in respect of a child of married parents who are divorcing, divorced or living apart. 
138 Section 19, Children’s Act. Section 313 repealed the Guardianship Act. 
139 Along with the responsibilities and rights of care (custody), contact (access) and maintenance: 
section 18(2), Children’s Act.  
140 Bonthuys 2006 (n 93) 486. The legislature’s concern with strengthening the position of unmarried 
fathers was demonstrated in two earlier laws that augmented their standing in adoption proceedings: 
the Natural Fathers of Children Born Out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997, and the Adoption Matters 
Amendment Act 56 of 1998.  
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automatic parental duties and rights.141 The Children’s Act leaves the incidents of 
guardianship essentially unchanged.142 
Besides codifying the common law position that biological mothers and married 
biological fathers are automatic guardians of their children143 and extending automatic 
guardianship to unmarried biological fathers in certain circumstances, the Children’s 
Act expands the pool of persons who may become guardians. ‘Any person having an 
interest in the care, well-being and development of a child’ may apply to the High 
Court for guardianship.144 Further, a parent who is s child’s sole guardian may appoint 
a ‘fit and proper person’ in their will to succeed as guardian.145 Guardianship may also 
be conferred in a ‘parental responsibilities and rights agreement.’146 In summary, 
under the Children’s Act, biological parents are generally automatic guardians, while 
other parties may become guardians via a court or testamentary appointment, or by 
agreement with an existing guardian.147  
The Children’s Act does not stipulate the standard of care for a guardian.148 At 
common law, a guardian is obligated to act as a bonus et diligens paterfamilias, a 
prudent and diligent person, and is delictually liable to the child for negligent or 
fraudulent action.149 The High Court, as upper guardian of all minors, may intervene 
in guardians’ exercise of their duties150 and may even assume guardians’ duties, e.g. 
by ratifying a contract151 or acting for minors in litigation.152  
 
141 Heaton (n 13) §18. Previously, unmarried fathers only had the duty of maintenance, and needed to 
apply to the court to be granted parental authority. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Sections 19 and 20, Children’s Act. 
144 Section 24, Children’s Act.  
145 Sections 27(1) and (2), Children’s Act. More than one guardian may be appointed: section 27(4). 
Transfer of guardianship is automatic upon the parent’s death and the appointed person’s acceptance—
no court process is necessary: section 27(3). 
146 Section 22, Children’s Act.  
147 The High Court, a divorce court in a divorce matter, or a children’s court may terminate, extend, 
suspend or restrict parental responsibilities and rights: section 28, Children’s Act. 
148 Himonga ‘Chapter 11 – Children (minors)’ in Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 
(2007) 211. 
149 Heaton ‘Chapter 3: Parental responsibilities and rights’ in Boezaart 2017 (n 5) 81.  
150 Ibid 99. 
151 The High Court has consented to a minor’s agreement when the parent or guardian acted ‘in a 
disinterested or unreasonable manner’ or when the parents were deceased: Boezaart 2016 (n 112) 
§4.5.2.2.1.  
152 This happened exceptionally in Vista University, Bloemfontein Campus v Student Representative 
Council, Vista University 1998 (4) SA 102 (O). It is more usual for the Court to appoint a curator ad 
litem to act for minors: Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §4.5.3.2.   
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Section 31(1) of the Children’s Act requires a person exercising parental 
responsibilities and rights to consider a child’s views and wishes before making a 
major decision concerning the child, ‘bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and 
stage of development.’ This duty applies to any decision ‘which is likely to 
significantly change, or to have an adverse effect on, the child’s living conditions, 
education, health, personal relations with a parent or family member or, generally, the 
child’s well-being’; such a broad definition likely captures guardians’ decisions.153 At 
common law, guardians may act unilaterally, e.g. enter a contract or commence 
litigation on behalf of a minor, and transact and invest as they deem fit.154 Section 
31(1) arguably incorporates consideration of the minor’s views or wishes into 
guardians’ duty of care.  
Section 31(1) brings into relief divergent depictions of guardianship in the literature. 
When guardianship is presented as a component of ‘parental responsibilities and 
rights,’ the decision-making onus of the guardian is emphasised:  
‘neither s 10 nor s 31(1) transfers the power or the duty to make a decision to 
the child. The child simply has the right to participate and to have due 
consideration afforded to his or her views and wishes….’155  
By contrast, when guardianship is conceived as a means of surmounting legal 
incapacity, minors are depicted not as peripheral participants but as primary actors 
who conclude contracts, transfer property and perform other juristic acts, with 
guardians ‘assisting’ to perfect their actions in the eyes of the law.156  
3.2.3. Comparing Guardianship under the Children’s Act with Curatorship and 
Natural Guardianship 
While section 18(1) of the Children’s Act provides that all parental responsibilities 
and rights (care, contact, maintenance and guardianship) need not vest in the same 
person, the ‘package’ of guardianship responsibilities and rights is non-severable. A 
guardian assumes all the responsibilities and rights listed in section 18(3), and cannot 
 
153 Section 31(1)(b), Children’s Act. 
154 Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 688.  
155 Heaton 2017 (n 149) 95.  
156 E.g. Barratt (n 113) 43-55; Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §4.5.2.2.   
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be appointed to deal with a single transaction or lawsuit or on a time-limited basis. 
This non-severability can be contrasted with curatorship at common law, which 
distinguishes a curator bonis from a curator ad litem, corresponding respectively to 
the distinct legal capacities of property administration and litigation.157 A curator 
bonis may be appointed for a general or limited purpose, while a curator ad litem is 
appointed to act in a specific case only.158 Chapter IV of the Administration of Estates 
Act (AEA) governs the appointment, duties and powers of a curator bonis (referred to 
simply as ‘curator’ in the AEA).159  
The AEA establishes a scheme for the appointment of ‘tutors’ and ‘curators’ for 
minors and other persons.160 A tutor looks after both the person and the property of a 
minor, while a curator is appointed to administer property only.161 A tutor or curator 
for a minor may be appointed by will or court order, but may not administer property 
without first being granted letters of tutorship or curatorship by the Master of the High 
Court.162 Section 76(1)(b) of the AEA sets out the powers that may be conferred by 
letters of curatorship, which include the authority ‘to perform any particular act in 
respect of the property’ and ‘to carry on, subject to any law... any business or 
undertaking of the person concerned.’163 Such wording indicates that a curator may 
have broad authority to contract, transfer ownership, and perform other juristic acts in 
administering a minor’s property.164  
In addition to tutors and curators, the AEA retains ‘natural guardian’ as a third 
category of persons who hold powers and duties in respect of minors’ persons and 
property.165 No definition of natural guardian is supplied in the legislation, and thus 
the common law applies. Generally, natural guardians enjoy wider latitude of action 
 
157 Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §6.6. A third type of curator, the curator personae, is responsible for making 
personal care decisions. 
158 Olivier & Denson ‘Part 1: Law of persons – Chapter 6: Other factors affecting status and capacity’ 
in Barratt (n 95) 99-100.  
159 Boezaart 2016 (n 112) §6.6.2.  
160 Sections 71 to 85, AEA.  
161 Meyerowitz The Law and Practice of Administration of Estates and Their Taxation (2010) §21.1. 
162 Sections 71, 72(1)(a) to (d), AEA. The Master of the High Court may initiate a search for potential 
curators if a minor requires a curator to administer their property: section 73(1)(a). 
163 Section 76(1)(b)(i) and (iv), AEA.  
164 Section 76(2) requires the Master to grant such powers to a curator as are stipulated in a will, written 
instrument or court order.  
165 See Schäfer’s critique in n 132. 
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under the AEA than tutors and curators.166 Commentators disagree on how ‘natural 
guardianship’ at common law and in the AEA is to be interpreted in the wake of 
legislative changes to guardianship. Section 1(1) of the Guardianship Act explicitly 
mentioned natural guardianship, providing that both married parents had ‘equal 
natural guardianship,’ while the Children’s Act omits the term. Meyerowitz gives 
natural guardianship the definition it held at common law prior to the 1993 
Guardianship Act—the ‘father of a legitimate child or if the father is dead or the court 
has awarded the sole guardianship to her, the mother,’ or ‘in the case of an illegitimate 
child... the mother’167— notwithstanding that this text was published in 2010, after the 
Children’s Act had come into force.168 By contrast, Van Heerden, writing in 1999 
(after the Guardianship Act had come into force but before the Children’s Act) takes 
into account the Guardianship Act’s amendment and interprets natural guardians to 
include married biological mothers.169  
Another point of confusion is whether a guardian appointed by the court or 
testamentary instrument under sections 24 and 27 of the Children’s Act respectively 
constitutes, for the purposes of the AEA, a natural guardian or a curator.170 Heaton 
takes the position that section 27 of the Children’s Act and section 72(1) of the AEA 
both deal with the appointment of a ‘testamentary guardian or custodian for a child.’171 
But the scope of guardians’ responsibilities and rights under the Children’s Act are 
more expansive than those of tutors or curators. Besides the administration of a 
minor’s property, a guardian must assist with administrative, contractual and other 
legal matters (i.e. serve as a curator ad litem), and give or refuse consent on behalf of 
the child in certain matters.172 Himonga observes that a testamentary guardian under 
the Children’s Act ‘steps into the shoes of the appointing deceased parents,’ while a 
testamentary tutor’s responsibilities are limited to property administration.173 As a 
practical matter, if testamentary or court-appointed guardians constitute tutors or 
 
166 Sections 77, 78 and 83 of the AEA impose certain security and accounting obligations on tutors and 
curators that do not bind natural guardians: see Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 688-9.  
167 Meyerowitz (n 161) §20.2. 
168 1 July 2007: Heaton (n 13) §18.  
169 Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 687-9.  
170 Himonga observes ‘it is unclear how the institution of tutorship is affected by the Children’s Act’: 
(n 148) 210. 
171 Heaton (n 13) §27. 
172 Section 18(3)(b) and (c), Children’s Act. 
173 Himonga (n 148) 210-1. 
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curators, they must obtain letters of tutorship or curatorship from the Master of the 
High Court and comply with security and annual accounting obligations.174 
Schäfer remarks it is unfortunate that the Children’s Act failed to follow the lead of 
the UK’s Children Act 1989 in explicitly abolishing the category of natural 
guardianship.175 It is submitted that a conceptually coherent reading of the Children’s 
Act and the AEA would interpret natural guardianship to encompass all parents with 
automatic guardianship rights and responsibilities, as well as testamentary and 
court-appointed guardians.  
To conclude, this section of Chapter 3 has shown that a guardian is endowed with 
significant authority to alter a child’s legal and economic positions. The Children’s 
Act has expanded the classes of parents upon whom automatic guardianship is 
conferred, and implemented processes for the attainment and loss of guardianship by 
parents and non-parents, but has not altered the scope of guardianship. Guardians now 
have a duty to consider minors’ views and wishes in major decisions. It has been 
argued that the Children’s Act’s guardianship scheme fits uneasily with the pre-
existing institutions of tutorship, curatorship and natural guardianship, categories that 
persist in the AEA.  
The three chapters that follow will discuss and evaluate how guardianship operates 
within the legal regimes governing estate succession, the distribution of pension 
benefits, and children’s maintenance claims against estates.  
 
174 Sections 71(1), 72(2), 77, 78 and 83, AEA.  
175 Schäfer (n 91) §8.4.3.1. 
   
 




CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN SUCCESSION OF ESTATES  
Viewing succession through the prism of children’s right to economic security 
highlights that children have both substantive and procedural rights in estates. This 
chapter begins with a brief overview of children’s substantive succession rights but 
will focus on procedural rights, the latter being most affected by minors’ legal 
incapacities. The sections that follow will examine mechanisms set out in the AEA to 
oversee the conduct of executors and guardians in their administration of deceased 
estates and minors’ property, highlighting gaps that may prejudice children’s rights.  
4.1. Overview of Substantive and Procedural Rights  
Minors have legal capacity to own movable and immovable property, and age does 
not affect their capacity to inherit.176 Illegitimacy is no longer grounds for denying 
inheritance rights.177 The nasciturus fiction applies to render a child conceived before 
and born alive after a parent’s death capable of inheriting.178 Major and minor 
dependants have the right at common law to seek maintenance from deceased 
estates.179 This gives disinherited minors substantive rights in their parents’ estates to 
the extent of their dependency.  
Intestate succession laws favour spouses and descendants over ascendants and other 
relations. When a person who dies intestate is survived by spouses and/ or 
descendants, other relations will not inherit.180 In this way, intestate succession 
corresponds, albeit imprecisely, to the primary support obligations owed by a deceased 
in life. Minors usually inherit from intestate estates as members of the descendant 
class, as children of the deceased or as descendants of a predeceased child of the 
deceased.181 Spouses take priority over descendants by operation of two rules. First, 
spousal entitlements under matrimonial property laws are deducted before an intestate 
 
176 Paleker ‘Chapter 7: Capacity to inherit’ in Jamneck et al (eds) The Law of Succession in South Africa 
3rd ed (2017) §7.2.2. 
177 Section 1(2), Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
178 See Paleker ‘Chapter 7’ (n 176) §7.2.3 and Meyerowitz (n 161) §19.4.  
179 Maintenance claims against estates are discussed in Chapter 6.  
180 Section 1(1)(a) to (c), Intestate Succession Act.  
181 It is rare for minors to inherit as spouses, although persons under age 18 who have reached puberty 
are permitted to marry in South Africa: Barratt (n 113) 66, 79.  
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estate is determined, reducing the size of the estate available for distribution pursuant 
to intestacy.182 Secondly, the Intestate Succession Act stipulates that a surviving 
spouse is entitled to whichever is greater of a ‘child’s share’ or an amount fixed by the 
Minister of Justice183 (currently R250 000184). A child’s share is calculated by dividing 
the value of the estate by the number of surviving children and predeceased children 
survived by descendants, plus the number of surviving spouses.185 This means that 
where a child’s share is valued below R250 000, a spouse will inherit a larger portion 
of the estate than a descendant. Where an estate is valued below R250 000, the estate 
devolves entirely to the surviving spouse(s) and descendants inherit nothing.186  
Turning to procedural rights, all deceased estates in South Africa are administered in 
accordance with the AEA and related regulations, under the supervision of the Master 
of the High Court.187 The AEA also regulates the administration of the property of 
minors, mentally incapable persons and absent persons, both in and outside of the 
succession context.188  
The Master of the High Court is a statutory office appointed by the Minister of Justice 
under section 2 of the AEA for every provincial division of the High Court in South 
Africa.189 The Master’s office supervises the entire estate administration process, 
notably executors’ performance of their duties.190 One of the Master’s primary tasks 
is scrutinising executors’ accounts to facilitate a proper and complete accounting of 
the estate.191 Additionally, the AEA allocates to the Master certain judicial and quasi-
judicial functions.192 The Master is empowered to determine whether the alienation or 
 
182 Paleker ‘Chapter 2: Intestate succession’ in Jamneck et al (n 176) §2.8.3. 
183 Section 1(1)(c), Intestate Succession Act. Also called a ‘child’s portion’ in section 1(4)(f).  
184 GNR 921 GG 38238 of 24 November 2014.   
185 Section 1(4)(f), Intestate Succession Act as amended by the courts: see Paleker ‘Chapter 2’ (n 182) 
§2.8.3. 
186 Paleker ‘Chapter 2’ (n 182) §2.8.3. 
187 This has been the case since the Constitutional Court’s decision in Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha 
Magistrate and others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) ended separate treatment of the intestate estates of black 
persons and required a unitary system for all estates: Rautenbach ‘Chapter 16: Administration of 
estates’ in Jamneck et al (n 176) §16.2.3.  
188 Section 4(2), Chapters IV-VI AEA; see Meyerowitz (n 161) §1.4.  
189 Rautenbach (n 187) §16.3.1.3. The Master’s office consists of the Master, Deputy and Assistant 
Masters and trained examiners. ‘Master’ and ‘Master’s office’ are used interchangeably in this 
dissertation.  
190 Ibid. 
191 Meyerowitz (n 161) §1.4. 
192 E.g. the Master may pronounce on jurisdiction (section 4(1)) and determine the merits of objections 
(sections 34(4), 35(9)).  
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mortgaging of a minor’s immovable property (up to prescribed values) is in the 
minor’s interest, and to authorise or refuse a proposed transaction or encumbrance.193 
The Master may also consent to the partition of immovable property on a minor’s 
behalf.194 In performing such functions, the Master may be said to be exercising the 
powers of an upper guardian.195 Every appointment, decision, ruling, order, direction 
or taxation made by the Master is reviewable by or appealable to the High Court.196 
Lastly, the Master’s office also serves as an office of record that preserves information 
and documentation related to every deceased estate within the Master’s territorial 
jurisdiction.197 
Minors rely on tutors and curators (hereafter ‘legal guardians’) and natural guardians 
to secure their entitlements from deceased estates and to administer their property.198 
The AEA uses several mechanisms to oversee the actions of executors and natural and 
legal guardians and to circumscribe the scope of their discretion: supervision by the 
Master and the High Court, the Guardian’s Fund, and the requirement of security. 
These mechanisms will be reviewed in the following sections, first as they apply to 
surviving relatives, executors and trustees, and secondly as they apply to natural and 
legal guardians, following the usual chronology of an estate administration.  
4.2. Responsibilities of Surviving Relatives, Executors and Trustees  
4.2.1. Preliminary Duty to Inform the Master’s Office  
When a person dies within South Africa leaving property or a testamentary document, 
the deceased’s surviving spouse(s), or if there is no surviving spouse, the nearest 
relative or connection living in the district where the deceased was ordinarily resident 
upon death, is required to give notice of the death to the Master within fourteen 
days.199 The full names of the deceased’s children and whether they are major or minor 
 
193 Section 80, AEA. Per GNR 920 GG 38238 of 24 November 2014, the Master may authorise the 
alienation of a minor’s immovable property valued below R250 000, and may authorise a mortgage not 
exceeding R250 000. Sales or encumbrances exceeding R250 000 require court authorisation. 
194 Section 94, AEA. 
195 As Meyerowitz observes: (n 161) §1.7.  
196 Section 95, AEA.  
197 Section 5(1), AEA; Meyerowitz (n 161) §1.9.  
198 As discussed in subsection 3.2.3, the AEA retains the category of ‘natural guardian,’ and it is unclear 
how the guardianship scheme in the Children’s Act fits with the AEA.  
199 Section 7(1)(a), AEA. Sections 7(1)(b), (2) and (3) stipulate alternate methods by which a death may 
be reported to the Master.  
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must be identified on the prescribed death notice form.200 The informant is also 
required to submit an initial inventory of the deceased’s property.201 The prescribed 
inventory form requires listing the names and addresses of all persons having an 
interest in the estate as heirs.202 Further, anyone possessing a document being or 
purporting to be a will must deliver it to the Master for registration as soon as they 
become aware of the testator’s death.203  
It is suggested that the prescribed death notice form be amended to require birth dates 
for all minor children of the deceased, and the inventory form amended to require birth 
dates for all minor heirs. Collecting this information at the outset of an estate 
administration would enable the Master’s office to better track minor parties, whose 
interests in estates receive distinct treatment under the AEA and who moreover enjoy 
distinct constitutional rights.204  
4.2.2. Requirement of Security 
An executor has authority to administer and represent an estate only after obtaining 
letters of executorship from the Master.205 Before letters of executorship are granted, 
executors must furnish security in an amount fixed by the Master, subject to 
exemptions specified in section 23 of the AEA. Security is not required if the executor 
is the parent, child or surviving spouse of the deceased, or if the testator has directed 
the Master to dispense with the requirement of security in the will.206 The amount of 
security is in the Master’s discretion but is usually set at the total value of the estate 
assets stated in the inventory.207  
 
200 Schedule 1, Form A ‘Death Notice,’ Regulations promulgated under section 103 in GNR 473 GG 
3425 of 24 March 1972, available at https://www.justice.gov.za/master/forms.html, accessed 13 
December 2019.  
201 Section 9(1), AEA. Additionally, the Master may order any person to make an inventory: section 
9(2).  
202 Schedule 1, Form B ‘Inventory,’ GNR 473 (n 201), available at 
https://www.justice.gov.za/master/forms.html, accessed 13 December 2019.  
203 Section 8(1) AEA.  
204 The prescribed form for liquidation and distribution accounts does require executors to list the full 
names and birth dates of minor heirs, but those are submitted towards the end of the administration 
process: section 5(1)(e)(ii)(a), GNR 473 (n 200). 
205 Section 13(1), AEA. An estate valued below a prescribed amount (R250 000 per GNR 920 (n 194)) 
may be administered without the appointment of an executor, with the Master giving directions for its 
liquidation and distribution: section 18(3).  
206 Section 23(1) and (2), AEA. Even if an exemption is met, the Master retains discretion to require 
security for ‘any good reason’: section 23(2).  
207 Section 23(1), AEA; Meyerowitz (n 161) §9.7.  
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Security serves to protect creditors, heirs and all other persons having a claim on the 
estate from maladministration. If the executor fails to properly administer the estate, 
the Master may enforce the security and recover the actual loss to the estate from the 
executor or sureties.208 Such protection is lost when an executor is exempted from 
furnishing security. Where the exemption is based on a direction in a will, the principle 
at play is respect for testamentary freedom. The justification is less apparent when the 
parents, children and surviving spouses of a deceased are exempted. The autonomy of 
action it enables within the immediate family sphere may be welcome. Yet it is often 
within the unequal power relations and partialities of the family where conflicts of 
interest arise and the safeguard of security is especially beneficial.209 Further, the 
blanket exemption applies irrespective of the beneficiaries entitled to inherit, who may 
comprise persons outside of the deceased’s immediate family.   
Exempting immediate family members from posting security also contradicts a 
presumption in South Africa’s law that legally-trained professionals make more 
competent executors than laypeople, a presumption expressed in two places. First, 
regulations promulgated by the Minister of Justice exhibit a preference for estate 
administration by attorneys, notaries, conveyancers and law agents.210 Secondly, the 
Cape Town Master’s office (and possibly others) has a practice of requiring a 
nominated executor who is a natural person with little or no estate administration 
experience to nominate a qualified person to assist with the administration as a pre-
condition for granting letters of executorship or dispensing with security pursuant to 
section 23(1) of the AEA.211 Meyerowitz contends there is no lawful basis for such a 
requirement.212 Nevertheless, the practice implicitly recognises that security protects 
against the negligence of lay executors, protection that is removed by the section 23(1) 
exemption for family members.  
 
208 Section 23(5), AEA; Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.46. 
209 Further, where a testator has not exempted an executor from the requirement of security, it may be 
argued that the statutory exemption violates testamentary freedom.  
210 The regulations are entitled ‘Regulations prohibiting the liquidation or distribution of the estates of 
deceased persons by any person other than an Attorney, Notary, Conveyancer or Law Agent’ GNR 910 
GG 967 of 22 May 1968. Meyerowitz at (n 161) §8.4 fn 1 questions the constitutionality of these 
regulations. 
211 Meyerowitz (n 161) §9.1. 
212 Ibid. 
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The exemption from posting security for surviving spouses in intestate estates has the 
most potential to disadvantage minors, since surviving spouses are co-heirs alongside 
descendants in intestate estates.213 Further, many surviving spouses are also the 
surviving natural guardians of minor descendants. A surviving spouse who is the 
executor of an intestate estate and the natural guardian of surviving children faces 
multiple conflicts of interest between their positions as executor, co-heir, and natural 
guardian. Without the safeguards of security or an independent guardian, minor 
descendants in this scenario are wholly dependent on the Master to ensure the executor 
does not favour their own interests over those of co-heirs. The exemption is justifiable 
if the value of an estate does not exceed the amount fixed under section 1(1)(c) of the 
Intestate Succession Act, since only surviving spouses would inherit and descendants 
would not. As it stands, the blanket exemption leaves the descendant class vulnerable 
to executor negligence.  
Security may also be imposed to protect minor beneficiaries’ interests in testamentary 
trusts. The administration of trusts is governed by the Trust Property Control Act 57 
of 1988 (TPCA). As with executors, even when a trust instrument exempts a trustee 
from security, the Master retains discretion to require security if there are sound 
reasons to do so.214 The Master has promulgated a memorandum setting out 
information that trustees must provide to inform the Master’s decision on security, 
including the ages of trust beneficiaries, the relationship of the trustee to beneficiaries, 
and the probable duration of the trust.215  
4.2.3. Supervision by the Master and the High Court  
An executor’s duties, generally, are to collect estate assets, settle liabilities, and 
distribute the estate to legatees and heirs in accordance with the deceased’s will or the 
Intestate Succession Act.216 An executor is a fiduciary acting in a representative 
 
213 Unless the estate is valued below the amount fixed under section 1(1)(c) of the Intestate Succession 
Act, as discussed in section 4.1. 
214 Section 6(2)(b) read with section 6(3)(d), TPCA. 
215 Form JM21 available at https://www.justice.gov.za/master/m_forms/JM21.pdf, accessed 20 
December 2019. Section 4(1) of the TPCA requires a trustee to lodge the trust instrument with the 
Master before assuming control of trust property. The Master’s website states that ‘all the requirements 
listed on form JM21 have to be lodged’ when registering a testamentary trust: 
https://www.justice.gov.za/master/trust.html, accessed 20 December 2019. 
216 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.24. 
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capacity for the estate and must act legally and in good faith.217 The Master may 
intervene at various points throughout the winding-up process, either ex mero motu or 
at the executor’s invitation, and certain actions and transactions must come before the 
Master or the High Court for approval or adjudication. These are described below. 
(a) Bank accounts: An executor is required to open a bank account once in receipt of 
estate funds in excess of R1 000.218 There is no general duty to furnish the Master with 
particulars of the estate account, but the information may be requested by the 
Master.219 Section 28(5) of the AEA gives the Master (and any surety) the same right 
to information about estate bank accounts as the executor, including the right to 
examine vouchers. Further, the Master may halt withdrawals and make withdrawals 
subject to the Master’s consent, or require that account funds be paid over to the 
Guardian’s Fund.220 Presumably the Master would only take the investigatory and 
injunctive steps envisioned in section 28 upon receiving an allegation of 
mismanagement, but the section does not set out a process by which such information 
may be relayed to the Master.221 Section 46 of the AEA penalises an executor for 
failing to pay over funds to the Master or to deposit funds into a bank account in 
accordance with section 28, making the executor personally liable to pay double the 
amount back to the estate.   
(b) Creditors’ claims: An executor who disputes a creditor’s claim may, after 
requiring the claimant to lodge an affidavit setting out details of the claim, seek the 
Master’s consent to have the claimant or another connected person examined under 
oath.222  
(c) Review of estate accounts and oversight of objections process: The Master’s 
review of executors’ accounts and oversight of the objections process is a key control 
protecting the interests of minor beneficiaries. An executor is required to submit 
liquidation and distribution accounts in a prescribed form within six months of 
 
217 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.20.  
218 Section 28(1), AEA.  
219 Section 28(2), AEA. 
220 Section 28(6), AEA. The Guardian’s Fund is discussed in subsection 4.3.2 below.  
221 This may be contrasted with section 22(1) of the AEA regarding executor appointments, which 
provides that anyone with an interest in the estate may lodge a written objection with the Master, and 
thereafter may apply to the Court for an order restraining the grant of letters of executorship. 
222 Section 32(1), AEA.  
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obtaining letters of executorship, unless the Master has granted an extension of time.223 
The executor must advertise that the account is lying open at the Master’s office for 
inspection after the Master has examined it.224 The Master advises the executor that 
the account has been examined by sending a ‘query-sheet,’ which may require 
amending the account.225 The distribution account must list all minor heirs with 
birthdates, which presumably enables the Master’s office to review the account with 
an eye towards protecting the minors’ interests and to ensure that the distribution of 
their shares meets legal requirements.226  
Once the estate account is advertised as lying open for inspection, the period for 
making objections by persons interested in the estate commences.227 Sections 35(7) to 
(10) of the AEA set out the timing of various procedural steps to be taken by the 
Master, the executor and an objector in relation to objections. The Master has 
jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of an objection and to direct the executor to 
amend the account or take other relevant action.228  
Section 46 of the AEA provides a statutory remedy when an executor uses or 
knowingly permits a co-executor to use estate property other than for the estate’s 
benefit. Such an executor is to pay into the estate an amount double the value of the 
property so used, subject to the Master’s discretion to relieve the executor from 
liability based on good cause shown.229  
(d) Proof of distribution: Section 35 requires a distribution ‘forthwith’ once all 
objections have been resolved and the requisite period for the account to lie open for 
inspection has expired.230 The executor is to lodge with the Master proof of 
distribution in the form of receipts and acquittances, and deeds of registration for 
immovable property.231 The executor must register immovable property to which an 
 
223 Section 35, AEA. The prescribed form is set out at section 5 of GNR 473 (n 200). The Master may 
require an interim account pursuant to section 35(2). 
224 Section 35(5)(a), AEA. 
225 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.12, §12.13.  
226 Namely sections 39-40, 42-45 of the AEA and requirements in the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
227 Section 35(7), AEA. Accounts are to lie open for inspection for no less than 21 days: section 35(4). 
228 Section 35(9), AEA. Per section 35(10) the Master’s decision is reviewable by the court on a motion. 
229 Section 46, AEA. Meyerowitz points out that a literal reading would make an executor liable to pay 
into the estate twice the value of an improperly-used asset that has not depreciated or been used up (e.g. 
house or car), rather than twice the value of the benefit obtained. This lack of proportionality would 
constitute good cause for granting at least partial relief from liability: (n 161) §12.19.  
230 Section 35(12), AEA. 
231 Section 35(12), AEA.  
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heir is entitled in the heir’s name,232 including immovable property inherited by a 
minor.233 The distribution of movable property to minors and the administration of 
minors’ immovable property will be examined more fully in section 4.3.  
(e) Mode and conditions of sale of estate assets: Subject to the terms of a will, an 
executor has discretion to determine whether to liquidate estate assets and which and 
how many assets to liquidate, subject to the rule that assets in residue must be sold 
before bequeathed assets.234 An executor is only required to liquidate what is 
necessary to satisfy estate liabilities.235 Unless a will directs otherwise, all heirs with 
an interest in a property must give written approval of the mode and conditions of sale 
prior to sale.236 However, where a minor, absentee or person under curatorship is 
interested in the property, the Master must approve the manner and conditions of the 
proposed sale.237 The Master performs the role of an upper guardian when acting for 
a minor under this section.  
(f) Section 38 ‘taking over’: Finally, the Master has discretion to determine whether 
to approve the ‘taking over’ of an estate or portion thereof by a surviving spouse under 
section 38 of the AEA.238 In approving a taking over, the Master must be satisfied that 
security is given for the shares of minor heirs and that no prejudice will result to any 
interested person.239  
 
232 Section 39, AEA. 
233 Section 25, Deeds Registries Act; Paleker ‘Chapter 7’ (n 176) §7.2.2. 
234 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.27, §12.28.  
235 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.27. 
236 Section 47, AEA. The heirs’ written consent is not required for ‘property of a class ordinarily sold 
through a stockbroker or a bill of exchange or property sold in the ordinary course of any business or 
undertaking carried on by the executor.’ The executor may seek the Master’s approval when the heirs 
cannot agree: section 47(b), AEA. On its face, section 47 applies to both movable and immovable 
property and is not confined to assets above a certain value.  
237 Section 47(a), AEA. Section 49(1) provides that the purchase of an estate asset by an executor or a 
connected person (e.g. spouse) is void unless it has been approved by the Master or the court. 
Meyerowitz notes that where there is a minor heir, the court must be satisfied that the purchase price is 
a fair one: (n 161) §13.14.  
238 Meyerowitz (n 161) §13.3 to §13.5. A ‘taking over’ is a special procedure under section 38, not to 
be confused with a redistribution agreement between a surviving spouse and beneficiaries, or the 
purchase of estate assets by a surviving spouse.  
239 Section 38(1), AEA. Meyerowitz states that where minors’ shares must be secured, the Master issues 
a special certificate making the transfer of property subject to the simultaneous passing of a mortgage 
bond in a specified amount in the Master’s favour: (n 161) §13.5. 
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4.3. Responsibilities and Rights of Natural and Legal Guardians  
The AEA interposes natural or legal guardians to act on behalf of minor heirs and 
property owners. The AEA disregards the common law distinction between infantes 
and minors age 7 and older with respect to their differentiated capacities to contract 
and to transfer property. All persons under the age of majority are treated the same in 
the AEA. Specifically, the common law rule that minors age 7 and older may acquire 
a benefit unassisted240 is superseded by the AEA provisions governing the distribution 
of minors’ inheritances, which prevent children of all ages from receiving movable 
property or money from estates directly.241  
Minors rely on guardians to assert their interest in a timely and proper estate 
administration at various stages of the process. Before turning to an examination of 
the AEA provisions governing guardians’ dealings with minors’ property, the 
following section reviews actions guardians may take on behalf of minors during the 
estate administration process.   
4.3.1. Discretionary Actions During Estate Administration  
(a) Repudiating succession benefits: De Waal contends that South African law permits 
a natural or appointed guardian to repudiate a succession benefit on behalf of a minor 
without court approval.242 He advises, however, that court approval be obtained out of 
an abundance of caution in three instances: (1) where the bequest is immovable 
property; (2) where the bequest only benefits the minor (repudiation in such a case 
being tantamount to a donation of the child’s property); and (3) where the repudiation 
would result in the guardian deriving a benefit.243 It is difficult to fathom why approval 
would be granted in the latter two scenarios, since a court must find the proposed 
repudiation to be in the best interests of the child.244  
(b) Objecting to issuance of letters of executorship (section 22 AEA): Any person with 
an interest in an estate object to the issuance of letters of executorship to a nominated 
 
240 As discussed in subsection 3.2.1.  
241 Sections 43 to 45, AEA. 
242 De Waal ‘Repudiation of Benefits on Succession on Behalf of Minors’ (1993) 4 Stell LR 232 at 237. 
243 Ibid 238.  
244 The repudiation of a bequest of immovable property may be in a minor heir’s interest, if, for example, 
the property is encumbered to such an extent that accepting the gift would result in no net gain.  
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executor. A minor heir, who may have legitimate cause for objection (e.g. concern 
over a conflict of interest), relies on their guardian to file an objection on their behalf. 
While section 22 grants the Master authority to refuse letters of executorship ex mero 
motu, as an institutional body, the Master does not have independent knowledge of 
facts pertaining to the appropriateness of a nominated executor—these must be 
supplied by the interested parties.   
(c) Seeking a court order requiring executor’s accounts or vouchers (section 36 AEA): 
Any person with an interest in the liquidation and distribution of an estate may, in the 
face of an executor’s noncompliance with statutory accounting obligations and after 
giving at minimum one month’s notice, apply to the court for an order directing the 
executor to lodge accounts or vouchers. A minor heir relies on their guardian to take 
this step.245  
(d) Inspecting and objecting to executor’s accounts (section 35(7) AEA): Any person 
interested in an estate may object to the executor’s liquidation and distribution 
accounts. There are often facts known only to beneficiaries (e.g. omission of assets 
from the accounts) that must be raised via objections; the Master, as an institutional 
body, cannot be expected to gain knowledge of such information independently. A 
minor beneficiary depends on their guardian to inspect the accounts on their behalf 
and to lodge a timely and adequate objection when necessary.  
(e) Seeking accounts from and court orders against trustees (sections 16, 19, 20 
TPCA): Trustees are obliged to keep accurate and proper accounts of the property 
under their administration, and trust beneficiaries are entitled to accounts and 
information.246 The TPCA authorises the Master to call upon a trustee to account.247 
The Master or any person with an interest in trust property may thereafter apply for a 
court order directing a recalcitrant trustee to comply with the Master’s prior request 
or to perform a duty,248 and may also apply for an order removing the trustee from 
 
245 Section 36 also authorises a Master to seek an order ex mero motu. 
246 Meyerowitz (n 161) §23.32.  
247 Section 16(1), TPCA. 
248 E.g. a beneficiary may compel a trustee to invest funds properly: Meyerowitz (n 161) §23.34.  
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office.249 Minor beneficiaries of trusts depend on their guardians to take these steps to 
enforce the proper administration of trust property by trustees.  
It is submitted that a guardian’s general obligation to ‘administer and safeguard the 
child’s property and property interests’250 includes attending to the steps outlined 
above when a minor has an interest in an estate. A guardian’s diligence or neglect can 
significantly impact the minor’s substantive entitlements. Delay and 
maladministration can result in the dissipation or depreciation of assets. Risk to the 
minor is increased when the executor or trustee has been exempted from furnishing 
security, or when a conflict of interest leaves the minor without a disinterested 
representative (e.g. when a natural guardian is also the executor and/ or a co-
beneficiary. While the Master is authorised to take independent action against 
executors and trustees, as an institutional body the Master is under an informational 
deficit and is unlikely to initiate investigatory or enforcement procedures without 
receiving pertinent information from parties with knowledge. Currently, the actions 
outlined above lie entirely within the discretion of guardians. A greater degree of 
monitoring or intervention may be desirable, e.g. to pre-empt conflicts of interest. 
Interventions should bear some relation to the degree of risk to the minor and the value 
of the property at stake.  
The subsections that follow will examine mechanisms in the AEA that regulate natural 
and legal guardians in their dealings with minors’ property, namely, the requirement 
of security, the Guardian’s Fund, and supervision by the Master and the High Court.  
4.3.2. Requirement of Security and the Guardian’s Fund  
The AEA restricts minors’ ability to receive and enjoy property due to them from 
estates. In respect of natural guardians’ dealings with minors’ property, the AEA 
distinguishes between movable and immovable property; treatment of the latter will 
be discussed in the next subsection. 
Section 43(1) of the AEA frames the receipt of a minor’s movable property (including 
money) from an estate as an entitlement of the natural guardian:  
 
249 Section 20(1), TPCA. 
250 Section 18(3)(a), Children’s Act. 
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‘The natural guardian of a minor shall... be entitled to receive from the executor 
for and on behalf of the minor, any movable property to which the minor is, 
according to any liquidation and distribution account in any deceased estate, 
entitled.’  
This entitlement is subject to the terms of a will, and contingent on the guardian 
furnishing security to the Master’s satisfaction, unless security is expressly exempted 
in a will.251 Security protects the minor’s interest in the guardian handing over the 
inheritance when the minor becomes entitled to it, and thus in the inheritance being 
properly invested and administered.252 When the property in question is money, if the 
natural guardian fails for whatever reason to furnish security within two months of the 
estate becoming distributable, the executor must pay the money into the Guardian’s 
Fund (described below).253 There is a lacuna in the legislation as to what happens if 
the movable property in question is not money and no natural guardian furnishes 
satisfactory security.254 An executor has neither a duty to liquidate a movable asset 
nor a duty to keep possession of it. Meyerowitz suggests that an executor in such a 
position may sell the asset and deposit the proceeds into the Guardian’s Fund, or apply 
to the court to have a curator appointed.255  
A natural guardian who receives a minor’s movable property is obliged to use it for 
the minor’s benefit or to safeguard it for future use.256 The Master may at any time 
call upon a natural guardian to account for their administration.257  
Every tutor or curator must lodge security to the Master’s satisfaction in order to be 
granted letters of tutorship or curatorship, unless the court or testamentary instrument 
 
251 Section 43(2), AEA.  
252 Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 701. 
253 Section 43(6) read with section 35(13), AEA; Meyerowitz (n 161) §20.2. A natural guardian who 
subsequently furnishes satisfactory security may, upon the Master’s direction, receive the sum out of 
the Guardian’s Fund on behalf of the minor: section 90(2). An exception is carved out for cash 
inheritances under R20 000 under the Chief Master’s Directive 2 of 2019 re: Payment of Minor’s 
Inheritance into the Guardian’s Fund of 16 April 2019. 
254 Meyerowitz (n 161) §20.4; Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 703. 
255 Meyerowitz (n 161) §20.4. 
256 Paleker ‘Chapter 7’ (n 176) §7.2.2. Section 4.4 considers when a minor’s inheritance may be applied 
towards maintenance.  
257 Section 43(3), AEA. 
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directs otherwise.258 Unlike for natural guardians, the AEA does not limit legal 
guardians’ duty to furnish security to movable property only.259  
The requirement of security serves as a powerful control to ensure the proper 
administration of minors’ property, and can disincentivise guardians from assuming 
the responsibility in the first place. The existence of the Guardian’s Fund ensures that 
the absence of a qualified guardian does not leave a minor’s money or other movable 
property in limbo. The Master administers the Guardian’s Fund, and the terms of its 
administration are found in Chapter V of the AEA. The Guardian’s Fund holds and 
administers money payable to the Master on behalf of various persons, including 
minors.260 The Guardian’s Fund is designed to offer security over profitability.261 
Interest is payable on funds held for minors.262 
4.3.3. Supervision by the Master and the High Court 
Natural and legal guardians must apply or account to the Master or the High Court 
before taking certain actions related to minors’ inheritances or property. This 
subsection examines the AEA provisions dealing with redistribution agreements, 
minors’ immovable property, accounting obligations, and the purchase of minors’ 
property by guardians.  
(a) Redistribution Agreements  
Beneficiaries with vested rights in an estate may reach a ‘redistribution agreement’ to 
arrange a different division of estate assets than set out in a will or under intestacy 
rules.263 A guardian represents a minor heir in such an agreement.264 The 
commentaries disagree on the circumstances when redistribution agreements require 
the Master’s or the court’s approval. Section 5(1)(e) of the regulations made under 
 
258 Section 77(1) and (2), AEA; Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.9. The costs of security are paid from the 
minor’s property: section 77(4), AEA. 
259 Only a natural guardian who furnishes the requisite security (unless exempted from doing so) has 
the right under section 43(1) to take possession of a minor’s inheritance money. Section 82 requires a 
tutor or curator to forthwith pay any money received on behalf of a minor to the Master, subject to 
certain exceptions. A tutor or curator does not have the option of furnishing security to retain possession 
of a minor’s money.  
260 Meyerowitz (n 161) §20.4. 
261 Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 717-8. 
262 Section 88(1), AEA.  
263 Rautenbach (n 187) §16.3.2.2.5; Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.31. 
264 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.31. 
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section 103 of the AEA provides that a redistribution agreement must accompany the 
liquidation and distribution account that the executor submits to the Master’s office.265 
From this, Rautenbach infers that the Master must approve the agreement, and posits 
further that ‘special requirements must be met in the case of minor beneficiaries.’266 
Meyerowitz, however, suggests that only a redistribution agreement in which a minor 
gives up an interest in immovable property requires the approval of the Master or the 
court.267 
(b) Minors’ Immovable Property  
The AEA limits the ability of guardians to alter minors’ rights in immovable property 
by requiring that certain dealings come before the Master or the court.  
A natural guardian may not alienate or mortgage a minor’s immoveable property 
without authorisation from either the Master or the court.268 A legal guardian may 
alienate or mortgage a minor’s property if authorised to do so in a testamentary 
instrument, otherwise, authorisation by the court or the Master is necessary.269 The 
Master or the court must be satisfied that a proposed alienation is in the minor’s 
interest.270 In the case of a mortgage, the Master must be satisfied that the proposed 
mortgage ‘is necessary for the preservation or improvement of the property or for the 
maintenance, education or other benefit’ of the minor.271 The partition or subdivision 
of a minor’s immovable property must also be approved by the Master.272 
Besides alienation, mortgaging, partition and subdivision, the AEA is largely silent on 
the practical aspects of owning immovable property, such as the payment of property 
rates, insurance, utilities and capital repairs. As discussed in subsection 4.2.3, 
 
265 GNR 473 (n 200). 
266 Rautenbach (n 187) §16.3.2.2.5.  
267 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.31. 
268 Section 80(1), AEA. The Master may authorise the alienation of a minor’s immovable property 
valued below a prescribed amount (currently R250 000: GNR 920 (n 193)). The Master may authorise 
a mortgage amount not exceeding R250 000. Sales or mortgages above the prescribed amounts require 
court authorisation.  
269 Section 80(1), AEA. The Master’s jurisdiction is limited to prescribed amounts set out in GNR 920 
(n 193). 
270 Section 80(2)(a), AEA and Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.24 and §21.25. Meyerowitz states that the court 
must be satisfied ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ that a proposed alienation is to the minor’s advantage.  
271 Section 80(2)(b), AEA. Per Meyerowitz, similar evidence should be submitted in an application to 
the court: (n 161) §21.25.  
272 Section 94, AEA. A natural guardian cannot consent on the  minor’s behalf, and section 94 does not 
displace the court’s power to order a partition or division of a minor’s property: Meyerowitz (n 161) 
§21.27.  
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immovable property from an estate devolving to a minor is to be registered in the 
minor’s name. Legal title provides a measure of protection, however, a guardian’s 
failure to attend to carrying costs and upkeep of an immovable property can entail 
serious consequences. The AEA implicitly recognises that guardians are responsible 
for the upkeep of minors’ immovable property in two provisions. First, section 
80(2)(b) states that the Master may authorise a mortgage on a minor’s property up to 
the prescribed amount273 if the mortgage is ‘necessary for the preservation or 
improvement of the property.’274 Such a mortgage may be necessary if the minor has 
no cash to fund carrying costs. Secondly, if a minor has money in the Guardian’s Fund, 
section 90(1) authorises the Master to pay to the minor’s guardian a sum up to the 
prescribed amount275 ‘for any investment in immovable property within the Republic.’  
Unlike for movable property, once an estate is distributed, the AEA does not give the 
Master ongoing jurisdiction to oversee natural guardians’ administration of minors’ 
immovable property.276 This is not the case with legal guardians. Since tutors and 
curators must lodge annual accounts,277 the Master may review their administration of 
immovable property on an ongoing basis. It is submitted that when the Master 
becomes aware of immovable property devolving to a minor heir, e.g. when reviewing 
an executor’s distribution account, the Master should enquire about a plan for upkeep 
and the payment of carrying costs.  
(c) Purchases of Minors’ Property by Natural and Legal Guardians  
As with executors,278 the AEA deems a self-dealing transaction by a tutor, curator or 
connected person void unless it has been authorised in a will or by the Master or the 
court.279 While there is no correlating provision for natural guardians, they are required 
to avoid conflicts of interest between their personal and fiduciary capacities, and a 
self-dealing transaction is prima facie a conflict of interest. Thus, a natural guardian 
 
273 R250 000 per GNR 920 (n 193). 
274 Meyerowitz elaborates that such mortgages may be for the purposes of paying rates and taxes, 
repairs, and improvements such as additional buildings, dams and irrigation works: Meyerowitz (n 161) 
§21.25.  
275 R250 000 per GNR 920 (n 193). 
276 Section 43(3) of the AEA empowers the Master to call upon a natural guardian to account for their 
administration of movable property at any time. 
277 Section 83, AEA. Discussed in this subsection at (d). 
278 Section 49(1), AEA. Discussed in subsection 4.2.3 n 238. 
279 Section 81, AEA.  
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who seeks to purchase a minor’s property must be prepared to demonstrate that it 
benefits the minor.280 
(d) Legal Guardians’ Obligations to Account 
The Master has ongoing jurisdiction to review the actions of legal guardians, whose 
authority to act derives from letters of tutorship or curatorship granted by the 
Master.281 A tutor or curator must submit to the Master an initial inventory of all of 
the minor’s property to be taken care of or administered.282 An updated inventory must 
be submitted whenever a tutor or curator comes to know of any additional property 
belonging to the minor.283 Further, legal guardians must submit yearly accounts to the 
Master, which must include a statement of all property under their control at the end 
of each accounting period, with supporting vouchers, receipts and acquittances.284  
As discussed in subsection 3.2.3, it is unclear whether a testamentary or 
court-appointed guardian under the Children’s Act constitutes a natural guardian or 
curator under the AEA. As shown, their status determines the scope of their 
obligations as well as the Master’s jurisdiction to oversee their property 
administration.  
4.4. Using Minors’ Inheritances for Maintenance 
Commentators are unanimous that minors’ inheritances may be used for their own 
support.285 This subsection reviews relevant provisions in the AEA before considering 
whether and when this is consistent with maintenance as a child’s right. 
Several provisions in the AEA refer directly to the use of a minor’s property for 
maintenance. Section 80(2)(b) provides that the Master may approve a mortgage on a 
minor’s immovable property for the purpose of ‘maintenance, education or other 
benefit.’ For a minor with money in the Guardian’s Fund, section 90(1) allows the 
 
280 Natural guardians who seek to purchase minors’ immovable property remain subject to the 
requirement in section 80(1) that the Master or the court approve the alienation of a minor’s property, 
as discussed in this subsection at (b). 
281 Section 71, AEA.  
282 Section 78(1)(a), AEA.  
283 Section 78(1)(b), AEA.  
284 Section 83(1)(a), AEA. 
285 See: Clark ‘Chapter 11 – Duties of support of deceased estates’ in Boberg’s (n 102) 275, Kruger (n 
16) 52.  
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Master to pay money out for the purposes of (inter alia) ‘maintenance, education or 
other benefit.’286 Thirdly, section 82(c) carves out exceptions to the general rule that 
legal guardians must pay any money received belonging to a minor to the Master; one 
such exception allows them to retain money that is immediately required for the 
minor’s maintenance or education. It is also interesting to note that at common law, a 
natural guardian is entitled to apply so much of a minor’s money as is immediately 
required towards maintenance or education.287  
The AEA provides no guidance on the criteria to be met in order to use a minor’s 
property for their maintenance or education. The determinations under sections 
80(2)(b) and 90(1) are made by the Master, while the decision whether and to what 
extent funds are ‘immediately required’ for maintenance is made by legal and natural 
guardians already with possession of the minors’ property.  
To properly account for minors’ right to receive and their limited duty to provide 
maintenance,288 it is submitted that the following factors are relevant to determining 
whether and to what extent the use of minors’ property for their own maintenance is 
justified:  
(1) If the property in question is an inheritance, whether the estate belonged 
to a parent or individual who owed the minor a legal duty of maintenance; 
and 
(2) whether any living person owes the minor a duty of maintenance.   
Rules developed at common law demonstrate the salience of these considerations. At 
common law, a distinction is drawn between use of a minor’s capital and income for 
their own support. A minor’s duty of self-support binds their income, whether 
generated through employment or investment, but a minor’s capital may only be 
drawn upon for maintenance if the minor’s income combined with parental support is 
insufficient, and court approval must be obtained.289  
 
286 There is no limit to the payments that may be authorised out of interest, but payments out of capital 
cannot in aggregate exceed the prescribed amount of R250 000 (GNR 920 (n 194)): Van Heerden 
‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 718 and Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.29, §12.30.  
287 Any portion not immediately required for maintenance or education must be invested in ‘prudent 
yet profitable securities’: Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 711. 
288 Discussed in subsection 3.1.4. 
289 Clark ‘Chapter 10’ (n 102) 245-6; Van Heerden ‘Chapter 19’ (n 106) 707-8. 
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Additionally, certain inheritances are given distinct treatment at common law. Courts 
have held that the benefits a child receives from the estate of a deceased parent, both 
capital and income, must be factored in when determining the sources of the child’s 
maintenance and the scope of the surviving parent’s maintenance duty.290 This 
position recognises that minors’ inheritances are, in most cases, not pure gifts or 
windfalls. If the deceased owed a duty of maintenance to the child while alive, the 
inheritance, either in entirety or in part, is a source of the child’s maintenance after 
death. This is most true in the case of a deceased parent, but given the imposition of 
support duties on non-parent relations (e.g. grandparents and remoter ascendants) in 
South African law,291 most testamentary dispositions in favour of minors arise within 
a relationship to which the law assigned a maintenance duty while the deceased was 
alive.292 Allowing a child’s inheritance to be used for maintenance in such cases 
enforces the estate’s support duty and ensures that the surviving parent does not bear 
a disproportionate burden of support. By the same token, requiring court approval can 
ensure that a surviving parent—who in many cases would be the natural guardian 
entitled to take control of the minor’s inheritance under section 43(1) of the AEA—
does not evade their support obligation by drawing solely upon the child’s inheritance 
for the child’s maintenance.  
A child-centred approach to children’s entitlements in succession would aim to 
prevent the unjustified dissipation of their property, while ensuring that their 
maintenance needs are adequately met. The AEA does not set out factors to guide 
courts and the Master in their adjudication of requests to use minors’ property 
 
290 Clark ‘Chapter 10’ (n 102) 246.  
291 Discussed in subsection 3.1.4. 
292 In South African law, apart from the parent-child relationship, the right to maintenance from a living 
relative does not extend to a right to maintenance from the relative’s estate even if a de facto support 
relationship existed. Mackintosh and Paleker, noting courts’ ambivalence towards recognising 
grandchildren’s maintenance claims against grandparents’ estates, argue for the development of the 
common law to permit such claims in cases where the grandchild’s parents are unable to fulfil their 
maintenance duties: Mackintosh & Paleker ‘A Grandchild’s Claim to Maintenance from a Deceased 
Grandparent’s Estate’ (2014) Acta Juridica 41 at 41. In the recent case of Van Zyl v Getz [2020] ZASCA 
84, the appellant asked the Supreme Court of Appeal to develop the common law to recognise a duty 
of support on the part of a grandparent’s estate, citing sections 9, 10 and 28(2) of the Bill of Rights. The 
court declined, finding that the evidentiary record was insufficient to justify altering the common law 
rule, as the appellant had failed to establish that the minor’s overseas parent was financially unable to 
provide support (paras 47-9). The court emphasised parents’ ‘special role and responsibility’ in raising 
their children in South African law, and held that support duties only fall to remoter relations when 
parents are unable to fulfil them (para 57). Further, the court raised the issue of institutional competence, 
opining that Parliament was better suited to enact a change to the common law that would have 
widespread policy and constitutional ramifications (paras 58-9).   
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(inheritances or otherwise) for the purpose of maintenance. Setting out factors would 
promote certainty and consistency in decision-making, as well as the development of 
jurisprudence that transparently interprets the interplay between parents’ and minors’ 
support duties.    
  
   
 




CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN PENSION BENEFITS  
With the enactment of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (PFA), South Africa became 
the first country in the world with comprehensive legislation governing retirement 
funds.293 As the PFA definition of ‘pension fund’ indicates, the main purpose of a 
retirement fund is to provide a benefit to its members upon retirement or to their 
dependants upon death.294 Pension funds have an inherent social function: enabling 
workers to save for retirement and dependants reduces pressure on the public purse to 
support needy seniors, widows and orphans.295  
Children benefit from pensions by qualifying as the dependants of fund members. 
Lehmann argues that most working South Africans are the ‘fortunate poor,’ earning 
formal income but owning little additional property, because most of their savings are 
locked into compulsory work pensions.296 Pension benefits may constitute the most 
sizeable asset that a working person leaves upon death and the main source of support 
for dependants. As such, pension entitlements are an important non-public source of 
funds for the fulfilment of children’s right to economic security.  
This Chapter examines the PFA scheme governing the distribution of pension death 
benefits. It will be argued that the decisions of the Pension Funds Adjudicator 
(‘Adjudicator’)297 regarding the payment of death benefits to minors reflect an 
outdated ‘parental power’ conception of guardianship that is out of step with a 
 
293 Hanekom (ed) Manual on Retirement Funds and Other Employee Benefits (2016) §1.2. There were 
approximately 3,200 registered retirement funds in South Africa as of 2016: Hanekom §1.5.1. The 
majority are subject to the PFA, but some are regulated by other legislation; for a list, see Hunter, 
Esterhuizen, Jithoo et al The Pension Funds Act, 1956: a commentary on the Act and selected notices, 
directives and circulars (2010) at xvii. This chapter focuses on funds governed by the PFA. 
294 Section 1(1), PFA and Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management (2016) at 6-7.   
295 In 2016, over 2.9 million seniors received South Africa’s old age means-tested social assistance 
monthly grant: Downie (n 294) 8.  
296 Lehmann ‘Testamentary Freedom versus Testamentary Duty: In Search of a Better Balance’ (2014) 
Acta Juridica 9 at 21. Examining the treatment of death benefits under the PFA, Lehmann concludes 
that the working poor enjoy little testamentary freedom in South Africa today.  
297 Insertion of Chapter VA into the PFA in 1996 established the office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator, whose mandate is to resolve complaints in a ‘procedurally fair, economical and 
expeditious manner’ (section 30D). The Adjudicator is empowered to make any order which a court of 
law may make (section 30E(1)(a)), thus performing a quasi-judicial function and constituting an 
administrative tribunal: Davidson ‘Chapter 9.24.1-6’ in Hanekom (n 293) §9.24.4. A body of pension 
law jurisprudence interpreting section 37C (the distribution of death benefits) has developed since the 
Adjudicator’s mandate began: Hunter et al (n 293) xxviii.  
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children’s rights paradigm. Legislation and courts have established that child 
maintenance lays a priority claim against pensions, whether the pension member is 
deceased or alive. But divergent approaches to guardianship result in differential 
protection of those maintenance payments in the two bodies of case law.   
5.1. Rights of Dependants in Section 37C of the Pension Funds Act  
Considered ‘one of the most important social security elements’ of the PFA, section 
37C regulates the main interest of dependants in pension funds.298 It stipulates that a 
lump sum benefit payable by a retirement fund on a member’s death does not form 
part of the member’s estate and must be distributed in accordance with the terms of 
section 37C, not the member’s will or the Intestate Succession Act.299 Hussain J of the 
South Gauteng High Court explained:  
‘Section 37 of the Act was intended to serve a social function. It was enacted 
to protect dependency, even over the clear wishes of the deceased. The section 
specifically restricts freedom of testation in order that no dependants are left 
without support.’300 
Section 37C places the duty to distribute a lump sum death benefit on the board of a 
pension fund. Distribution entails three steps. First, the board must determine the pool 
of potential beneficiaries by identifying the deceased member’s dependants and 
nominees.301 Section 1 of the PFA defines ‘dependant’ broadly to include legal 
dependants, factual dependants, spouses, children, and future dependants.302  
 
298 Hunter et al (n 293) xix. Section 37C was introduced in a 1976 amendment. 
299 A retirement fund is not required to provide for the payment of a lump sum death benefit, but when 
it does, section 37C applies: Hunter et al (n 293) 683. A 2007 amendment to section 37C(1) explicitly 
excludes pensions payable to a member’s spouse or child from the application of section 37C: Jeram 
‘Chapter 9.15 – Disposition of lump sum death benefits in terms of section 37C: An analysis of the case 
law’ in Hanekom (n 293) §9.15.4. The rules of a retirement fund determine the calculation of the lump 
sum benefit. It typically consists of the member’s fund credit (contributions plus investment returns 
less deductions) and an insured benefit that is usually a multiple of the member’s salary: Jeram ‘Time 
for a change to payment of minors’ death benefits’ (2014) 29(4) Insurance and Tax 1. 
300 Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund [2002] 8 BPLR 3703 (W) at 3705-
6.  
301 Section 37C(1), PFA. The High Court has held that the board must undertake a ‘thorough and 
credible investigation’ to locate beneficiaries: Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.5.6.  
302 A future dependant is someone for whom ‘the member would have become legally liable for 
maintenance, had the member not died’: section 1(1) PFA. For a detailed discussion of each category 
of dependants, see Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.5.  
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Secondly, the board must effect an equitable distribution of the death benefit.303 The 
PFA does not define ‘equitable distribution.’ The Adjudicator has consistently called 
for boards to consider the following non-exhaustive factors: the amount available for 
distribution, beneficiaries’ ages, beneficiaries’ relationships with the deceased, the 
extent of dependency, the deceased’s wishes, and beneficiaries’ financial 
circumstances.304 Legal liability for maintenance and any existing maintenance orders 
are taken into account as part of ‘extent of dependency.’305 Where there are multiple 
minors, the board must consider their ages and the likely duration of their respective 
periods of dependency.306 The board must weigh all relevant factors and not fetter its 
discretion by adopting rigid policies.307 Given section 37C’s social purpose, 
distribution to dependants supersedes nominees, and an equitable distribution does not 
need to include all nominees.308 
Once the recipient beneficiaries have been identified and an equitable division 
determined, the board must decide on the appropriate mode of payment.309 A death 
benefit may be paid to (1) a beneficiary directly (rarely appropriate for minors310); (2) 
a trustee of a trust nominated by the member, major beneficiary, guardian, curator or 
caregiver;311 (3) a guardian, curator or caregiver;312 or (4) a registered beneficiary 
fund.313 Additionally, the board may retain a minor beneficiary’s benefit in the pension 
fund’s own portfolios and pay it out in instalments, with reasonable interest added.314  
 
303 Section 37C(1), PFA. 
304 Hunter et al (n 293) 691; Dyani & Mhango ‘Reflections on Recent South African Pension 
Jurisprudence on Death Claims’ (2011) 32 Industrial LJ 2385 at 2388.  
305 Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.7.3.3.  
306 Ibid §9.15.7.3.4. 
307 Hunter et al (n 293) 691. When reviewing a board’s decision under section 37C, the Adjudicator 
applies a deferential standard, reviewing for the proper exercise of discretion: Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 
299) §9.15.7.3.7.  
308 Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.2. Payment may be made to the deceased member’s estate only 
when there are no dependants or nominees, or when there are only nominees and estate debts exceed 
assets, but only to the extent necessary to pay off debts: section 37C(1)(c) and (b), PFA. 
309 Section 37C(2), PFA. 
310 This has become rarer since the Children’s Act lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18 years: 
Hunter et al (n 293) 696.  
311 Section 37C(2)(a)(i), PFA.  
312 Section 37C(2)(a)(ii), PFA. Hunter et al interpret caregiver to include de facto caregivers who are 
not guardians: (n 296) 699-701.  
313 Section 37C(2)(a)(iii) and (b), PFA. Beneficiary funds (defined in section 1, PFA) are a species of 
pension fund introduced in 2008 to receive section 37C death benefits and to administer, invest and pay 
them to beneficiaries, usually minors: Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.8.1. 
314 Section 37C(3), PFA. 
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Disputes over boards’ decisions about the mode of payment of minor beneficiaries’ 
pension benefits have come before the Adjudicator in many cases. The next section 
considers the approach to guardianship taken in these cases.  
5.2. Payment of Minors’ Death Benefits to Guardians 
The Adjudicator has consistently held that a death benefit payable to a minor under 
section 37C must be paid to the minor’s guardian unless a board has cogent reasons to 
‘deprive’ the guardian of the right to administer the funds.315 Commentators generally 
affirm this position. For example, Jeram states that once a board has decided against 
direct payment to a minor, ‘the consequent enquiry is whether payment should be 
made directly to the guardian of the minor.’316  
The Adjudicator in Ramanyelo v Mine Workers Provident Fund317 set out four factors 
for boards to consider when deciding whether to make payment to a guardian:  
1. the amount of the benefit; 
2. the guardian’s ability to administer the funds;  
3. the guardian’s qualifications (or lack thereof) to administer the funds; and 
4. use of the benefit to provide for the minor until the age of majority.318 
A Senior Assistant Adjudicator observed in 2007 that complaints brought before the 
Adjudicator revealed a pattern of pension boards paying minors’ benefits into trust 
without first investigating the viability of payment to guardians.319 The Adjudicator 
has repeatedly held that a board’s total failure to consider payment to a guardian 
constitutes an improper exercise of discretion.320 
 
315 E.g. Lebepe v Premier Foods Provident Fund and Others [2007] 3 BPLR 325 (PFA) para 5.9; Baloyi 
v Ellerine Holdings Limited Staff Pension Fund [2005] 7 BPLR 606 (PFA) para 14, Dhlamini v Smith 
& another [2003] 7 BPLR 4894 (PFA) para 21.  
316 Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.8.1. 
317 [2005] 1 BPLR 67 (PFA).  
318 Ibid para 16.  
319 MacKenzie ‘Who will guard the Guards? An appraisal of minors’ pension benefits placed into trust’ 
(2007) 22(4) Insurance and Tax 40 §2.4. MacKenzie highlights the pecuniary interests that may have 
motivated some pension funds to prefer payment to trusts rather than guardians. These incentives (and 
the underlying conflicts of interest) may have diminished in the wake of 2008 legislative changes 
requiring beneficiary funds to be registered and regulated under the stricter rules of the PFA: Swanepoel 
‘Chapter 9.1’ in Hanekom (n 293) §9.1.4.   
320 Jeram ‘Chapter 9.15’ (n 299) §9.15.8.1 fn 402; Ramanyelo (n 317) para 17; Lebepe v Premier Foods 
Provident Fund and Others (n 315) para 5.10. 
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Nothing in the text of section 37C dictates that payment to a guardian should be 
preferred over the other modes of payment listed. The Adjudicator’s ‘guardians’ 
rights’ approach echoes section 43(1) of the AEA, which frames the receipt of a 
minor’s movable property from an estate as a natural guardian’s ‘entitlement.’321 A 
critical difference, however, is that the natural guardian’s right to receive a minor’s 
movable property from a deceased estate under section 43(1) of the AEA is contingent 
on the guardian furnishing security.322 In contrast, the PFA imposes no requirement of 
security nor oversight of a guardian’s use of a minor’s death benefit once it is 
disbursed.323  
It is submitted that the Adjudicator’s approach to guardianship reflects an outmoded 
‘parental power’ model that is incompatible with the children’s rights paradigm that 
has been progressively embraced in South African law. Part of the problem may lie in 
the legislature’s failure to clarify the effect of the Children’s Act on the institutions of 
curatorship, tutorship and natural guardianship, which originated in the parental power 
era.324 Furthermore, as observed in subsection 3.2.2, the incidents of guardianship in 
the Children’s Act did not depart in any fundamental way from the schemes that 
preceded it, notwithstanding the Children’s Act’s ostensible goal of transforming 
existing laws to enhance children’s rights. As a result, children’s rights within 
guardianship remain obscured, even in cases where their economic security is at stake.  
The Adjudicator’s scrutiny of pension boards’ ‘deprivation’ of the right of guardians 
to administer children’s benefits obscures the fact that guardianship itself deprives 
minors of the right to manage their own property. In a children’s rights framework, 
restricting autonomy is justifiable if it furthers children’s other interests, for example, 
their interest in the proper management of their property when they lack the requisite 
capacity. Two of the Ramanyelo factors recognise this interest to some extent by 
requiring assessment of a guardian’s financial competency. However, the premise that 
financial acumen ensures the proper use of a minor’s funds is questionable. As Jeram 
points out, ‘one may have a guardian who is very well qualified in finances… but does 
 
321 Discussed in subsection 4.3.2. 
322 Section 43(2), AEA.  
323 Hunter et al contend that unless a board, when paying out a minor’s death benefit, knew or ought 
reasonably to have known that a guardian was incapable of managing the minor’s financial affairs, it 
bears no liability for a guardian’s subsequent mismanagement of the benefit: (n 293) 698-9.  
324 As discussed in section 3.2.3. 
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that really mean he/ she will use the monies in the best interests of the minor 
children?’325  
The Adjudicator’s preference for direct lump sum payment of the section 37C benefit 
to guardians overlooks the value of periodic payment in achieving the provision’s 
underlying social purpose: providing for dependants. Section 37C contemplates two 
modes of payment that enable periodic payment to a guardian: by a registered 
beneficiary fund,326 or by the pension fund itself.327 With these two modes of payment, 
the capital is professionally invested, and the guardian’s responsibility is limited to 
managing and using periodic payments for the minor’s maintenance. Where the value 
of a minor’s benefit is high, requiring administration over a long investment horizon, 
periodic payment to a guardian may strike the appropriate balance between ensuring 
the preservation of benefits for the duration of children’s dependency and giving a role 
to guardians in the administration of their children’s property.328  
In maintenance cases with living payors, periodic payment is the norm. Certainly, 
most payors need to work to meet their support obligations and can only ‘pay as they 
earn,’ but even when lump sums are available, courts have ordered maintenance be 
paid monthly. It is now established that courts can order the attachment of pension 
funds, annuities, and proceeds from the sale of immovable property to secure the 
payment of future child maintenance.329 In making such orders, courts do not accept 
that custodial guardians are automatically entitled to receive maintenance as a lump 
sum. Rather, courts have ordered pension funds to withhold members’ benefits and to 
make monthly maintenance payments to custodial parents.330 The pension fund in 
 
325 Jeram 2014 (n 299). 
326 Section 37C(2)(a)(iii) and (b), PFA. 
327 Section 37C(3), PFA. 
328 The fourth Ramanyelo factor recognises the value of ensuring the section 37C benefit is available 
over the period of a minor’s dependency, but the Adjudicator’s jurisprudence shows that this factor is 
usually disregarded when a guardian is found who is not otherwise disqualified. 
329 In Mngadi v Beacon Sweets and Chocolates Provident Fund and Other [2003] 7 BPLR 4870 (D) at 
4879, Nicholson J, recognising that the Maintenance Act provided remedies for maintenance arrears 
but not future maintenance, found that the court was nevertheless empowered to devise ‘innovative 
remedies’ to enforce constitutional rights, which included children’s right to maintenance as protected 
by section 28 of the Constitution. The decisions in Magewu v Zozo and others [2004] 3 All SA 235 (C), 
Soller v Maintenance Magistrate, Wynberg and Others [2006] 1 BPLR 53 (C) and Burger v Burger 
and Another 2006 (4) SA 414 (D) reinforced this authority. See also discussions in Moodley (n 15) 
190-1 and Bonthuys 2008 (n 87) 196. 
330 Mngadi v Beacon Sweets and Chocolates Provident Fund and Other (n 329) at 4880; 
Magewu v Zozo and others (n 329) at 243. 
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Government Employees Pension Fund v Bezuidenhout and another 
(‘Bezuidenhout’),331 faced with such an order, objected to being burdened with 
administrative duties outside of its normal functions.332 The appellate court agreed, 
directed the pension fund to deposit the member’s benefit into the Guardian’s Fund 
instead, and directed the Master to make monthly maintenance payments to the 
custodial parent from the deposited funds.333 It now appears to be routine for courts to 
make Bezuidenhout-style orders that require the Guardian’s Fund and the Master to 
administer periodic child maintenance payments from deposited pension monies.334  
The complex administrative procedure devised in Bezuidenhout, which expends 
public resources, would be avoided if courts followed the Adjudicator’s lenient 
approach to guardianship and simply authorised pension funds to pay out lump sums 
to custodial guardians. Courts’ preference for the periodic payment of future 
maintenance from pensions demonstrates that the Adjudicator’s expansive 
interpretation of guardianship is not inevitable and calls into question the advisability 
of paying out section 37C benefits to minors’ guardians in a lump sum, without the 
safeguard of security. Indeed, Jeram recommends mandating the payment of all 
minors’ death benefits to beneficiary funds or trusts that would then pay maintenance 
to guardians in instalments, which he observes would bring section 37C in line with 
the trend of mandatory annuitisation in pension law.335 The AEA’s use of security and 
accounting obligations to protect minors’ inheritances in the hands of guardians brings 
into relief the lack of similar safeguards in section 37C of the PFA. Since a pension 
increasingly constitutes the most valuable asset a working South African may leave 
behind, this discrepancy merits legislative attention.  
 
331 Unreported judgment of the Transvaal Provincial Division, Appeal No 2113/04 (2006). 
332 As described in Lamprecht ‘The Payment of Money for Maintenance into the Guardian’s Fund’ 
(February 2010) 5 The Judicial Officer (Journal of the Judicial Officers’ Association of South Africa) 
4 at 5. 
333 Discussed by the court in Mbhele v Mbhele [2010] ZAKZPHC 29 (KZN HC) para 11.  
334 The Chief Master of the High Court issued two directives in 2017 and 2018 to ensure uniformity of 
practice among the Master’s offices in respect of future maintenance funds deposited pursuant to 
Bezuidenhout-style orders: Chief Master’s Directive 1 of 2017 re: To ensure uniformity in respect of 
the way in which the Guardian’s Fund deals with Future Maintenance Funds deposited with the Master, 
and Chief Master’s Directive 1 of 2018 re: Interest on future maintenance and age of majority for 
purposes of Sec 91 Adverts as from 01 April 2018. 
335 Jeram 2014 (n 299). The objective of reforms mandating the annuitisation of other pension benefits 
is the preservation of private savings to fund members’ retirements. The same preservation objective is 
equally valid for pension benefits that are intended for dependants’ maintenance.   
   
 




CHILDREN’S CLAIMS FOR MAINTENANCE AGAINST ESTATES 
It is long-established in South African common law that the right of children to 
maintenance binds their parents’ estates.336 This Chapter considers the substantive and 
procedural aspects of children’s right to maintenance from estates, identifying gaps in 
protection.  
6.1. Substantive Rights  
A parent’s duty to support a child does not terminate at death but transmits to the 
deceased estate.337 Maintenance claims rank after creditors’ claims but before the 
entitlements of beneficiaries.338 To succeed, the claimant must demonstrate need, and 
any benefits received from the parent’s estate, whether capital or income,  and whether 
on intestacy or by will, are taken into account.339 Some decisions suggest that an 
estate’s liability arises only when the surviving parent cannot adequately support the 
child.340 However, commentators observe that since parents during their lifetime share 
the burden of child support proportionate to their means, the same principle should 
apply after a parent has died.341 In calculating support, the child’s accustomed standard 
of living and the estate’s means are taken into account.342  
Maintenance from an estate may be payable while the estate administration is ongoing. 
Section 26(1A) of the AEA empowers an executor, with the Master’s consent, to 
release estate funds ‘to provide for the subsistence of the deceased’s family or 
household’ before the executor’s account has lain open for inspection. The court in 
Du Toit v Thomas found that this section vests an executor with not only the discretion 
 
336 Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) 19. The estates of both fathers and mothers are liable: Carelse v Estate De 
Vries (1906) 23 SC 532 and Goldman v Executor Estate Goldman 1937 WLD 64. Major children are 
not precluded: Hoffmann v Herdan [1982] 3 All SA 48 (T). The right of surviving married spouses to 
maintenance from estates is enshrined legislatively: Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
(MSSA). 
337 Du Toit v Thomas and others [2015] JOL 33337 (WCC) para 17. 
338 Clark ‘Chapter 11’ (n 285) 275. A spousal maintenance claim ranks equally with a child’s, and the 
claims abate proportionately if necessary: section 2(3)(b), MSSA.  
339 Clark ‘Chapter 11’ (n 285) 275; Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.31. Although not mentioned by 
commentators, non-estate benefits payable to a child upon a parent’s death, such as pension benefits 
and life insurance proceeds, are likely also counted as assets that reduce a child’s need.  
340 Discussed in Clark & Van Zyl (n 85) 19, Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.31. 
341 Kruger (n 16) 52, Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.31. 
342 Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) 19, Clark ‘Chapter 11’ (n 285) 276. 
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but the responsibility to alleviate family hardship pending estate distribution, which 
includes paying child maintenance.343 Meyerowitz posits that the executor’s power 
under section 26(1A) ‘does not embrace a member of the family or household who is 
not a beneficiary or creditor.’344 However, this is disputed by the Du Toit decision. In 
that case, the court recognised that the child claimant had a maintenance entitlement 
over and above her entitlement as heir, and gave no indication that maintenance paid 
under section 26(1A) constituted an early distribution of her inheritance or would be 
capped at her total entitlement as beneficiary.345 Furthermore, the court grounded the 
executor’s duty towards dependants in constitutional and maintenance law.346 This 
suggests that the relief available under section 26(1A) is not only temporal but 
substantive, and available to disinherited dependants.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal has ruled that the proceeds of life policies in respect of 
which there are unrevoked nominated beneficiaries cannot be ‘clawed back’ into an 
estate for the purpose of satisfying a spousal maintenance claim.347 The ruling likely 
applies to children’s maintenance claims also, which rank equally with spousal claims 
in priority of payment.348 This means that even when a deceased parent’s estate is 
insufficient to meet the needs of a dependent child, the child has no remedy against 
life policy proceeds payable or paid to a nominated beneficiary. Injustice may result 
whereby dependants’ needs are left unmet while a non-dependent beneficiary receives 
life policy proceeds. As shown in Chapter 5, section 37C of the PFA demonstrates the 
legislature’s willingness to constrain testamentary freedom in the pension arena to 
give effect to maintenance rights. Life insurance policies may warrant the same 
treatment.349   
Finally, while children lacking sufficient parental support have the right to be 
maintained by a living grandparent, the case law conflicts on whether children can 
 
343 [2015] JOL 33337 (WCC), affirmed on other grounds [2016] JOL 36040 (SCA) paras 21-22, 28.  
344 Meyerowitz (n 161) §12.2A. 
345 Du Toit (n 343) para 3. 
346 Du Toit (n 343) paras 17-8, 31. 
347 Oshry v Feldman [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA) paras 45-7. 
348 See n 338. 
349 In the author’s home jurisdiction of Ontario, Canada, the statute that enables dependants to claim 
support from an estate contains a powerful ‘clawback’ provision that deems the capital value of certain 
transactions part of an estate for the purpose of paying dependants’ support (section 72 Succession Law 
Reform Act, RSO 1990 c. S. 26). Designated life insurance policy proceeds are captured by this 
provision.  
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claim maintenance from their grandparents’ estates.350 Mackintosh and Paleker argue 
for courts to develop the common law to recognise such a right, citing socio-economic 
and constitutional imperatives.351  
6.2. Procedural Aspects  
To vindicate their right to maintenance from deceased estates, minor children must 
have the representation or assistance of a guardian or curator ad litem.352 Timely action 
is usually critical, as children may lack immediate necessities without maintenance, 
and the distribution and dissipation of estate assets may frustrate maintenance 
recovery. While a minor’s maintenance claim is preserved as a condictio indebiti 
action after an estate has been distributed, unjust enrichment must be proved, and 
recovery is limited to the amount by which the defendant heirs are enriched.353  
Uncertainty surrounds several important procedural aspects of minors’ maintenance 
claims against estates, which are explored below.  
6.2.1 Application of the Maintenance Act and Jurisdiction of Maintenance 
Courts 
Courts have disagreed on whether minors’ maintenance claims against estates fall 
within the purview of the Maintenance Act and maintenance courts.354 In NB v 
Maintenance Officer, Butterworth,355 the court decided that the Maintenance Act did 
not apply to the investigation of maintenance claims against estates, holding that a 
claimant who is dissatisfied with an executor’s response to a maintenance claim should 
resort to the ‘perfectly sound and expedient remedies’ in the AEA, rather than ‘expect 
maintenance courts to become embroiled in complex and lengthy matters pertaining 
to the administration of estates and the rights and duties of executors.’356  
 
350 Clark ‘Chapter 11’ (n 285) 271-2 and fn 16; Mackintosh & Paleker (n 292) 50-56. 
351 Mackintosh & Paleker (n 292) 75-77; see also discussion in n 295.   
352 To overcome their legal incapacity, as discussed in subsection 3.2.1.  
353 Clark & Van Zyl (n 84) 19. Surviving spouses cannot claim maintenance from an estate after 
distribution: section 2(2) MSSA. In practice, the condictio indebiti is rarely relied upon to recover 
maintenance from heirs. Mackintosh & Paleker found only one reported case where the remedy was 
successfully invoked: (n 292) 53. 
354 Kruger (n 16) 53. 
355 2014 (6) SA 116 (ECM). 
356 Ibid paras 4, 8, 22, 26.  
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The court in Du Toit took an opposite view, holding that not allowing the same 
maintenance remedies to a child with a deceased parent as a child with living parents 
would result in inequality before the law.357 The court held that an executor’s duty to 
‘provide for the subsistence of the deceased’s family or household’ while in charge of 
estate property under section 26(1A) of the AEA, brought executors within the ambit 
of the Maintenance Act.358 Citing children’s constitutional and international rights, the 
court emphasised that the Maintenance Act was enacted to provide children with fair 
and equitable maintenance remedies, including access to the ‘cheap and effective’ 
relief of maintenance courts, as opposed to the costlier route of the High Court 
prescribed under the AEA.359 While the court in Butterworth focused narrowly on the 
capacities of maintenance courts, the court in Du Toit emphasised their constitutional 
purpose.360  
6.2.2. Parties to Settlement or Trial of a Minor’s Maintenance Claim 
There is uncertainty as to whether other beneficiaries must be parties to a minor’s 
maintenance claim against an estate. Section 2(3)(a) of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act (MSSA) provides that the proof and disposal of spousal maintenance 
claims shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the AEA, subject to 
certain exceptions.361 This suggests that a spousal maintenance claim is lodged with 
the executor in the same manner as creditors’ claims under section 29 of the AEA, and 
that the executor may demand proof or dispute or reject claims in accordance with 
sections 31, 32 and 33. However, unlike with ordinary creditors’ claims, section 
2(3)(d) of the MSSA stipulates that an executor ‘shall have the power to enter into an 
agreement with the survivor and the heirs and legatees having an interest in the 
agreement’ to settle a surviving spouse’s maintenance claim. The wording in this 
provision is permissive, suggesting that an executor is not required to seek the consent 
of affected beneficiaries before deciding a spousal maintenance claim. In Van Rooyen 
Friedrich and others v Smit and others362 the executor did not first consult affected 
 
357 Du Toit (n 343) paras 34-5. The court took pains to distinguish the Butterworth case factually (paras 
43-45), but the key legal findings contradict.   
358 Ibid para 32. 
359 Ibid paras 31, 33-4. 
360 For Kruger, the reasoning in Du Toit is superior: (n 16) 54.  
361 Exceptions listed in section 2(3)(b), (c) and (d), MSSA. 
362 [2017] JOL 37564 (SCA). 
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beneficiaries before allowing a spousal maintenance claim, which had the effect of 
significantly diminishing the estate remaining for distribution. The beneficiaries thus 
objected to the executor’s liquidation and distribution account, which was pursued in 
the High Court (trial and full bench) and ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. Although the executor’s finding that the spouse was entitled to maintenance 
was overturned, his authority to consider and allow the claim in the first place was not 
disputed. In practice, affected beneficiaries will always have an opportunity to be 
heard in the resolution of maintenance claims against estates, either during the 
negotiation of a settlement under section 2(3)(d) of the MSSA, or through the 
objection process once the executor’s accounts have been lodged with the Master.  
While children’s maintenance claims against estates have no legislated procedural 
requirements, the principles underlying sections 2(3)(a) and (d) of the MSSA appear 
equally applicable to children’s claims.363  
6.2.3. Approval of the Master or Court 
As discussed in Chapter 4, one way the AEA protects minors’ pecuniary interests is 
by assigning a supervisory function to the Master and the court over certain conduct 
of executors and guardians. Whereas section 26(1A) of the AEA requires the Master’s 
consent to a pre-distribution subsistence payment, the requirement of approval for the 
final settlement of a minor’s maintenance claim is found in case law. In Davis’ Tutor 
v Estate Davis, the court opined that an executor has legal authority to reach an 
agreement with a minor’s tutor regarding maintenance, but that the executor may also 
refer the matter to the court after an agreement is made.364 The court held that a 
maintenance agreement reached between an executor and a minor’s tutor is always 
subject to the approval of the Master and confirmation of the court.365 The requirement 
of court confirmation enables the High Court to perform its duty as upper guardian366 
and to take into account the interests of beneficiaries.367  
 
363 A redistribution agreement, discussed in subsection 4.3.3, may be another an appropriate way to 
settle a minor’s maintenance claim if the minor is also an estate beneficiary. 
364 1925 WLD 168 at 172. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.31. 
367 Davis’ Tutor v Estate Davis (n 364) 174. 
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A maintenance agreement may be submitted to the Master at the same time as the 
executor’s liquidation and distribution accounts, at which time beneficiaries may 
lodge objections.368 The case law does not illuminate the type of evidence that should 
be filed with the Master or the court when seeking approval of a maintenance 
agreement. It is also not clear what standard or factors would apply to an assessment 
of a maintenance agreement. The Davis decision suggests only an agreement that 
makes ‘totally inadequate provision’ for a minor may be disallowed—a low bar.369 
The MSSA specifically addresses the common scenario of a conflict of interest 
between ‘the interests of the survivor in his capacity as claimant against the estate of 
the deceased spouse and the interests in his capacity as guardian of a minor dependent 
child of the deceased spouse.’370 In such a case, section 2(3)(c) provides that ‘the 
Master may defer the claim for maintenance until such time as the court has decided 
on the claim.’ It is unclear whether ‘the claim’ refers to the spouse’s claim, the 
minor’s, or both. This provision implies that the High Court is more competent than 
the Master to safeguard a minor’s interest where the minor’s guardian has a conflict 
of interest, though the wording is permissive rather than obligatory—the Master may 
defer adjudication to the court. It is unclear whether this provision precludes out-of-
court settlement in every case where the guardian has a conflict of interest.  
6.2.4. Mode of Payment of Minor’s Maintenance 
Maintenance payable to a minor from an estate constitutes ‘movable property to which 
the minor is, according to any liquidation and distribution account in any deceased 
estate, entitled’ under section 43(1) of the AEA. As such, a minor’s natural guardian 
is entitled to receive the maintenance sum, subject to the duty in section 43(2) to 
furnish satisfactory security.371 If there is no natural guardian, the sum may be paid 
into the Guardian’s Fund or be administered by a tutor or curator, who must also 
furnish satisfactory security.372  
 
368 As was done in Van Rooyen Friedrich and others v Smit and others (n 362). 
369 Davis’ Tutor v Estate Davis (n 364) 172. 
370 Section 2(3)(c), MSSA. 
371 As discussed in subsection 4.3.2.  
372 Section 77, AEA, as discussed in subsection 4.3.2.  
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Maintenance from an estate may be paid to a minor’s guardian in a lump sum, or the 
executor may set aside an amount from which to make periodic payments, using the 
interest earned thereon plus any portion of capital as is necessary.373 In Davis, the court 
fixed a monthly maintenance entitlement for the minor, and ordered the executor to 
set aside a capital sum that would generate sufficient income to pay the monthly 
maintenance.374 The court ordered the capital sum be ‘invested by agreement between 
the tutor dative and the executrix and with the concurrence of the Master of the 
Supreme Court.’375 In In re Estate Visser,376 the primary estate beneficiary, who 
inherited a farm property, was ordered to pay maintenance for the deceased’s children 
periodically using income generated by the farm.377 Meyerowitz contends that 
periodic payment is preferable, because it is difficult to determine ex ante the total 
amount of maintenance a minor requires and when a minor may become self-
supporting, in which event any remaining funds should be distributed to the heirs and 
legatees.378  
Periodic payment ostensibly makes maintenance responsive to a child’s evolving 
economic circumstances, but the schemes in Davis and Visser can create legal and 
operational uncertainties. Would such a scheme constitute a trust under the TPCA? Is 
a court or an executor entitled at law to to create a trust with estate property and to 
appoint the executor (or a beneficiary, if following Visser) as trustee? Further, such an 
arrangement binds a minor and their guardian to a relationship with the trustee for the 
duration of the minor’s dependency, which may be many years. As in cases with living 
support payors, periodic payment shifts the risk of non-payment and the burden and 
cost of enforcement onto minors and guardians.379 It is not clear, furthermore, whether 
minors in these cases may access the remedies in the Maintenance Act, or if the AEA 
or TPCA govern exclusively.  
The periodic payment schemes in Davis and Visser differ from those ordered by courts 
securing future maintenance against pension benefits380 in one important respect: in 
 
373 Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.31. 
374 Davis’ Tutor v Estate Davis (n 364) 174. 
375 Ibid. 
376 1948 (3) SA 1129 (C). 
377 Clark ‘Chapter 11’ (n 285) 277 fn 42. The beneficiary granted a mortgage to the Master as security. 
378 Meyerowitz (n 161) §21.31. 
379 As discussed in subsection 3.1.3, enforcement remains weak in South Africa’s maintenance system. 
380 I.e. cases like Bezuidenhout (n 331), discussed in section 5.2. 
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the latter cases, a lump sum is first set aside as the minor’s property, with periodic 
payment imposed for the purposes of ensuring sufficient funds for the duration of a 
minor’s dependency and limiting maladministration by a guardian. In contrast, as 
Meyerowitz’s explanation suggests, the preference for periodic payment in estate 
maintenance cases is motivated by a concern that minors not be overcompensated 
future maintenance to the perceived detriment of heirs and legatees. Periodic payment 
is used as a ‘wait and see’ approach to avoid the calculation of a minor’s lump sum 
entitlement and to preserve the entitlements of heirs. It is submitted that this approach 
is incongruent with modern developments in maintenance and succession law, which 
prioritise support of one’s dependants over testamentary freedom. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the difficulty of calculating lump sum future support is overstated, as 
courts are routinely able to do so in actions for loss of support,381 accounting for 
contingencies and probabilities, such as the likelihood of a dependant becoming 
self-sufficient while still a minor.  
It is submitted that children’s right to maintenance from an estate is best fulfilled by 
combining the certainty of a lump sum secured as the minor’s property with the 
benefits of periodic payment, namely ensuring funds for the duration of the minor’s 
dependency and limiting potential maladministration. Existing mechanisms in the 
AEA can protect minors’ interests in maintenance funds from estates, obviating the 
need for the type of quasi-trust arrangements devised in the Davis and Visser cases, 
which both predate the enactment of the AEA. Again, unlike pension death benefits,382 
the payment of maintenance from an estate to a natural or legal guardian is subject to 
the safeguard of security.383 Thereafter, the AEA grants the Master continuing 
oversight powers: natural guardians may be called upon at any time to account for 
their administration of minors’ money received from an estate,384 while legal 
guardians must submit accounts on an annual basis.385 The requirement of security 
plus the spectre of oversight serve to limit maladministration. When a guardian cannot 
or will not furnish security, the sum is paid into the Guardian’s Fund,386 and the Master 
 
381 Kruger (n 16) 54. 
382 Under section 37C of the PFA, discussed in Chapter 5. 
383 Sections 43(2) and 77, AEA. 
384 Section 43(3), AEA. 
385 Section 83(1)(a), AEA. 
386 Section 43(6), AEA read with section 35(13); Meyerowitz (n 161) §20.2. 
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may be ordered to make periodic maintenance payments, following the Bezuidenhout 




387 Discussed in section 5.3. 
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CHAPTER 7.  
CONCLUSION 
South Africa has made a constitutional commitment to treat the best interests of 
children as paramount in all matters concerning them.388 It is now undisputed that 
children have a right to maintenance that imposes concomitant duties on the State, 
parents and relatives. This dissertation has reviewed steps taken by Parliament to 
strengthen the private maintenance system as well as the efforts of courts to stringently 
enforce maintenance recovery. In policy and research, children’s constitutional right 
to maintenance is primarily configured in the circumstances of parental absence or 
recalcitrance, with little attention paid to the continuity of that right in the 
circumstance of parental or caregiver death.  
This dissertation has asserted that children enjoy the right to economic security 
throughout childhood, and thoroughgoing child-focused legal reform requires 
breaking down conventional silos to establish that right across legal fields. It has been 
shown that children’s right to economic security in the wake of parental or caregiver 
death cuts across the laws of maintenance, minority, guardianship, succession, 
pensions and trusts, and that procedural law affects substantive rights. The shift in 
South African pension and succession law towards prioritising duties of support over 
testamentary freedom enhances orphans’ economic security. Nevertheless, various 
gaps in protection remain. Specific recommendations have been made:  
• that the Master’s office be informed of and track minor parties at the outset of 
an estate administration;389  
• that the statutory exemption from furnishing security for certain categories of 
executors be reconsidered, in light of the heightened risk of children’s interests 
being jeopardised in conflicts of interest;390 
• that legislation provide greater guidance on the use of children’s assets for their 
own maintenance, in order to promote certainty and consistency and prevent 
the unjustified dissipation of minors’ property;391  
 
388 Section 28(2), Constitution.  
389 See subsection 4.2.1. 
390 See subsection 4.2.2.  
391 See section 4.4. 
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• that security and oversight mechanisms be used to protect minors’ pension 
benefits under section 37C of the PFA392 and maintenance funds secured from 
estates;393  
• that life insurance proceeds be made a potential source of funds to satisfy 
children’s maintenance claims;394 and 
• that uncertainties in the law of maintenance claims against estates be resolved, 
including the jurisdiction of maintenance courts, the applicability of the 
Maintenance Act, and the evidentiary standard applied by when approving 
settlements.395  
More generally, it is submitted that South Africa’s laws of legal minority and 
guardianship ought to be reviewed in light of modern children’s rights norms. 
Guardianship is inherently protectionist, premised on the idea that children require 
special legal protection by reason of age. Historically, this has produced a paternalistic 
‘parental power’ model of guardianship. The modern conceptualisation of children as 
autonomous rights-bearers does not controvert their need for special protection, but 
demands that measures be justified with reference to their interests and rights, not 
those of their parents. The Children’s Act has widened the circle of persons entitled to 
obtain guardianship, but has not transformed the scope of guardianship nor clarified 
how the statutory scheme interacts with the common law and the pre-existing 
institutions of natural guardianship, tutorship and curatorship set out in the AEA. This 
is brought into relief in the succession context, where one finds conflicting case law, 
disparate interpretations of guardianship, and the persistence of a ‘guardians’ rights’ 
approach. Recognising children’s right to economic security requires reassessing the 
presumptions underlying the laws of minority and guardianship, and implementing a 
system with oversight and accountability measures that empowers guardians to help 




392 See section 5.2.  
393 See subsection 6.2.4. 
394 See section 6.1. 
395 See section 6.2.  
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